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The Turing machine, as it was presented by Turing himself, models
the calculations done by a person. This means that we can com-
pute whatever any Turing machine can compute, and therefore we
are Turing complete. The question addressed here is why, Why
are we Turing complete? Being Turing complete also means that
somehow our brain implements the function that a universal Turing
machine implements. The point is that evolution achieved Turing
completeness, and then the explanation should be evolutionary, but
our explanation is mathematical. The trick is to introduce a mathe-
matical theory of problems, under the basic assumption that solving
more problems provides more survival opportunities. So we build
a problem theory by fusing set and computing theories. Then we
construct a series of resolvers, where each resolver is defined by its
computing capacity, that exhibits the following property: all prob-
lems solved by a resolver are also solved by the next resolver in the
series if certain condition is satisfied. The last of the conditions
is to be Turing complete. This series defines a resolvers hierarchy
that could be seen as a framework for the evolution of cognition.
Then the answer to our question would be: to solve most problems.
By the way, the problem theory defines adaptation, perception, and
learning, and it shows that there are just three ways to resolve any
problem: routine, trial, and analogy. And, most importantly, this
theory demonstrates how problems can be used to found mathe-
matics and computing on biology.
Keywords: problem solving; adaptation, perception & learning; Turing
completeness; resolvers hierarchy; evolution of cognition.
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§1 Introduction
Devoid of problems, thinking is useless.
Warning This paper does not explain how to solve, nor how to resolve, any problem.
§1.1 Object
¶1 · The object of this paper is to present a mathematical theory of problems. The
resulting problem theory provides meaning to set theory and to computing theory.
¶2 · Problems are nearly everywhere. We can say that mathematics is all about mathe-
matical problems, but also that physics is all about physical problems, and philosophy is
all about philosophical problems. I said nearly because there are not problems in a river;
a river just flows. So, where are problems?
¶3 · This problem theory gives an answer: There are problems where there is freedom.
Determinists will surely object, but they should note that if there were only uncertainty,
and not the possibility of doing otherwise, then problem resolving would be purposeless
and absurd. Nevertheless, in this theory freedom cannot exist by itself, but freedom is
always limited by a condition and both together, freedom and a condition, are a problem.
In fact, the resolution of any problem is the process of spending all of its freedom while
still satisfying the condition. So resolving is fighting freedom away. And, if people fight
for freedom, it is because we want problems; in fact, not having any problem is boring.
But I would say more, we are devices exquisitely selected to resolve problems, because
surviving is literally the problem of being dead or alive: “To be, or not to be—that is the
question.”
¶4 · I am digressing, sorry! The point is that problems are related to sets at the very
bottom: for each problem there is a condition that determines if anything is a solution
to it or not, so for each problem there is a set, the set of its solutions, and the condition
is its characteristic function. This means that problems and sets are just two names for
the same thing. So problem theory, being just a rewording of set theory, would be a
better foundation for mathematics than set theory, because problems are more related to
thinking than sets are.
¶5 ·We have just seen how problems and solutions fit with sets, but we have seen nothing
about resolutions, that is, the ways to go from a problem to its solutions. It is a fact
that computing is helping us in resolving many problems. Perhaps too many: How our
modern society would subsist without computers? I am digressing again, sorry! The right
question is: What is the relation between problem resolving and computing?
¶6 · Computing is the mechanical manipulation of strings of symbols. Mechanical in the
sense that the manipulations do not take into account the meaning of the symbols, but
they just obey blindly a finite set of well-defined rules. Being meaningless, what could
be the purpose of computing? Historically, computing resulted from two apparently
different pursuits: the foundation of mathematics, and the enhancement of calculating
machines. The second, the development of mechanical aids to calculation, is easier to
understand. When we learn the algorithm for division we readily appreciate that those
fixed rules can be better applied by a machine than by a person. This explains why an
arithmetic calculator comes handy when resolving a problem that requires performing a
numerical division. And it could also help us to understand why computation was seen
as the ideal for mathematical rigor, and then how computing relates to the foundations
of mathematics.
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¶7 · But, again, what is the purpose of mathematical formalization? Is it true that a
complete formalization of mathematics would render it meaningless? What would be
the use of something meaningless? And again, the arithmetic calculator, dividing for us,
answers the three questions: formalization prevents mistakes and assures that nothing
has been taken for granted, and, while it is literally meaningless, it is not useless if the
formalism helps us in resolving problems. Though pending on an if, formalism is not yet
lost. This paper cuts that Gordian knot by showing that problem resolving is computing.
¶8 · In fact, that ‘resolving is computing’ comes from the founding paper of computing.
Turing (1936) proved that the Entscheidungsproblem, which is the German word for
‘decision problem’, is unsolvable, because it cannot be solved by any Turing machine.
For this proof to be valid, ‘solved by a Turing machine’ has to be equal to ‘solved’, and
therefore ‘resolved by computing’ has to be redundant.
¶9 · Summarizing, a problem is a set, and resolving is computing. This is how this problem
theory relates to set and computing theories at the highest level of abstraction. For a
more detailed view you should continue reading this paper.
§1.2 Contents
¶1 · The object of this paper is to introduce a mathematical theory of problems. Because
our approach is minimalist, aiming to keep only what is essential, we will define a prob-
lem theory from first principles. Section §2 contains this problem theory, including its
eight concepts: problem, with freedom and condition; resolution, with routine, trial and
analogy; and solution. Some care is advisable to distinguish ‘solution’ from ‘resolution’,
because while they are usually considered synonyms, they are very distinct concepts in
this theory: a solution is a state, and a resolution is a transition. Then that ‘a problem
is resolved unsolvable’ achieves a very precise meaning.
¶2 · Section §3 translates the problem theory to set theory. Subsection §3.1 defines what
a problem is, and what is the set of its solutions is defined in Subsection §3.2. Then, in
Subsection §3.3, we develop the first two ways to resolve a problem, by routine and by
trial, while we devote Subsection §3.4 to the third way, by analogy. The conclusion of
these two subsections is that there is a general form that includes the three forms. Then
we observe that looking for a resolution to a problem is also a problem, the metaproblem,
so Subsection §3.5 deals with metaproblems. The last subsection of this section, Subsec-
tion §3.6, shows that there is only one level of problem meta-ness and that there are five
types of resolution.
¶3 · The next section, Section §4, is about computing. In Subsection §4.1 we present the
Turing machine, concluding that all computing is inside countable sets. In Subsection §4.2
we deal with universal computers and Turing completeness. Then, in Subsection §4.3,
we explain that Turing’s thesis implies that everything is an expression, that resolving
is computing, and that all problem sets are countable. In Subsection §4.4, we introduce
the full resolution machine, and we show some equivalences between problem theory and
computing theory. In the last subsection of this section, Subsection §4.5, we show that
there are five types of problem.
¶4 · Section §5 is about resolvers, that is, devices that resolve problems. In the first
subsection, §5.1, we present the practical scenario, where functions are not solutions, so
we distinguish the semantics of solutions from the syntax of functions, and we define the
range of a resolver as the set of problems that the resolver solves, and the power of a
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resolver as the set of problems that the resolver resolves. Then we construct a series of
five resolvers:
◦ Mechanism, Subsection §5.2, is any device that implements a semantic unconditional
computation. We show that mechanisms can resolve problems by routine.
◦ Adapter, in §5.3, is any device that implements a semantic conditional computation.
We show that adapters can resolve problems by trial.
◦ Perceiver, in §5.4, is any device that implements a semantic functional computation or
a syntactic unconditional computation. We show that perceivers can resolve problems
by analogy and metaproblems by routine.
◦ Learner, in §5.5, is any device that implements a syntactic conditional computation.
We show that learners can resolve metaproblems by trial.
◦ Subject, in §5.6, is any device that implements a syntactic functional computation.
We show that subjects can resolve metaproblems by analogy.
In addition, we show that the range and power of each resolver in the series includes
the range and power of the previous one, provided that a specific condition is satisfied.
The last of these conditions requires the subject to be Turing complete. So, in the last
subsection of this section, §5.7, we summarize the findings of the section: we show that
there is a hierarchy of five types of resolver, and that the problem theory is complete. The
theory is complete because Turing completeness is the maximum computing capacity, and
this means that there are exactly three ways to resolve any problem: routine, trial, and
analogy. Finally, we argue that we are the Turing complete subjects that have resulted
from an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem.
¶5 · The paper finishes with some conclusions, in Section §6. In the first subsection,
§6.1, we explain how problem theory provides purpose and meaning to set theory and to
computing theory. In the next subsection, §6.2, we argue that countableness is the golden
mean that keeps paradoxes under control. And in the last subsection, §6.3, we explore
what would be the implications of non-computable ways of resolving, as intuition.
§2 Theory
§2.1 Problem
¶1 · Every problem is made up of freedom and of a condition. There have to be possibilities
and freedom to choose among them, because if there is only necessity and fatality, then
there is neither a problem nor is there a decision to make. The different possible options
could work, or not, as solutions to the problem, so that in every problem a certain
condition that will determine if an option is valid or not as a solution to the problem
must exist.
Problem
{
Freedom
Condition
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§2.2 Solution
¶1 · A fundamental distinction that we must make is between the solution and the res-
olution of a problem. Resolving is to searching as solving is to finding, and please note
that one can search for something that does not exist.
Resolving · Searching
Solving · Finding
Thus, resolution is the process that attempts to reach the solutions to the problem, while
a solution of the problem is any use of freedom that satisfies the condition. In the state-
transition jargon: a problem is a state of ignorance, a solution is a state of satisfaction,
and a resolution is a transition from uncertainty to certainty.
Problem
Resolution−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Solution
¶2 ·We can explain this with another analogy. The problem is defined by the tension that
exists between two opposites: freedom, free from any limits, and the condition, which is
pure limit. This tension is the cause of the resolution process. But once the condition is
fulfilled and freedom is exhausted, the solution annihilates the problem. The resolution
is, then, a process of annihilation that eliminates freedom as well as the condition of the
problem, in order to produce the solution.
Freedom
Condition︸ ︷︷ ︸
Problem
}
Resolution−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Solution
¶3 · A mathematical example may also be useful in order to distinguish resolution from
solution. In a problem of arithmetical calculation, the solution is a number and the
resolution is an algorithm such as the algorithm for division, for example.
§2.3 Resolution
¶1 · There are three ways to resolve a problem: routine, trial, and analogy.
Resolution


Routine
Trial
Analogy
¶2 · To resolve a problem by routine, that is, by knowing or without reasoning, it is
necessary to know the solutions, and it is necessary to know that they solve that problem.
¶3 · If the solutions to a problem are not known, but it is known a set of possible so-
lutions, then we can use a trial and error procedure, that is, we can try the possible
solutions. To resolve by trial is to test each possible solution until the set of possible
solutions is exhausted or a halting condition is met. There are two tasks when we try: to
test if a particular possibility satisfies the problem condition, and to govern the process
determining the order of the tests and when to halt. There are several ways to govern
the process, that is, there is some freedom in governing the trial, and so, if we also put
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a condition on it, for example a temporal milestone, then governing is a problem. And
there are three ways to resolve a problem (da capo).
¶4 · By analogy we mean to transform a problem into a different one, called question,
which is usually composed of several subproblems. This works well if the subproblems are
easier to resolve than the original problem. There are usually several ways to transform
any problem (there is freedom), but only those transformations that result in questions
that can be resolved are valid (which is a condition), so applying an analogy to a problem
is a problem. There are three ways to resolve the analogy, the question, and each of its
subproblems: routine, trial, and analogy (da capo). If we could translate a problem into
an analogue question, and we could find a solution to that question, called answer, and
we could perform the inverse translation on it, then we would have found a solution to
the original problem.
Problem Solution
↓ ↑
Question −→ Answer
§2.4 Eight Concepts
¶1 · Lastly we are ready to list the eight concepts of the problem theory. They are:
problem, with freedom and condition; resolution, with routine, trial, and analogy; and
solution.
Problem Theory


Problem
{
Freedom
Condition
Resolution


Routine
Trial
Analogy
Solution
§3 Sets
§3.1 Problems
§3.1.1 Notation We will refer to the set of problems as P. We will refer to the set of
resolutions as R. We will refer to the set of solutions as S.
Definition A resolution takes a problem and returns the set of the solutions to the
problem. Then resolutions are R = P → 2S, where 2S is the powerset, or the set of
the subsets, of S.
§3.1.2 Notation ⊤ stands for ‘true’, and ⊥ for ‘false’. We will refer to the set of these
Boolean values as B. B = {⊤,⊥}.
Comment ⊤ = ¬⊥ and ⊥ = ¬⊤. Also [P = ⊤] = P and [P = ⊥] = ¬P .
§3.1.3 Notation Given s ∈ S ⊆ S and f ∈ F ⊆ (S → S), so f : S → S and f(s) ∈ S,
we will use the following rewriting rules:
f(S) = { f(s) | s ∈ S }, F (s) = { f(s) | f ∈ F }, and F (S) = { f(s) | s∈S × f ∈F }.
Comment As f(s) ∈ S, then f(S) ∈ 2S, F (s) ∈ 2S, and F (S) ∈ 2S.
Proposition If s ∈ S and f ∈ F , then f(S) ⊆ F (S) and F (s) ⊆ F (S).
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§3.1.4 Definition Problem π is x?Ppi(x), where Ppi is any predicate, or Boolean-valued
function, on S; so Ppi : S→ B, where Ppi(x) = ⊤ means that x is a solution of π, and
Ppi(x) = ⊥ means that x is not a solution of π.
Comment A problem π = x?Ppi(x) is made up of freedom and of a condition, as defined
in Section §2. The condition is Ppi, and freedom is represented by the free variable x,
which is free to take any value in S, x ∈ S.
§3.1.5 Definition A function ∗f is effectively calculable if there is a purely mechanical
process to find ∗f(s) for any s.
Comment This definition of effective calculability was stated by Turing (1938), §2.
Comment If the result of the calculation is finite, then an effective calculation has to
complete it. If the result of the calculation is infinite, then an effective calculation
has to proceed forever towards the result.
Notation We will refer to the set of effectively calculable functions as ∗F.
§3.1.6 Definition A problem π is expressible if its condition Ppi is an effectively cal-
culable function.
Comment The result of a condition is in set B = {⊤,⊥}, so it is always finite. Therefore
a problem is not expressible if for some x we cannot calculate whether x is a solution
or not in a finite time.
§3.1.7 Definition The condition isomorphism is the natural isomorphism that relates
each problem π with its condition Ppi: for each predicate P there is a problem,
x?P (x), and for each problem, π = x?Ppi(x) there is a predicate, Ppi. That is,
P⇔ (S→ B) : x?Ppi(x)↔ Ppi.
Comment Using the condition isomorphism, two problems are equal if they have the
same condition, that is, π = ρ⇔ Ppi = Pρ.
Comment The condition isomorphism abstracts freedom away.
§3.1.8 Theorem The set of problems is the set of predicates, that is, P = S→ B.
Proof P ∼= S→ B, by the condition isomorphism, see §3.1.7, and, abstracting freedom,
P = S → B. But freedom has to be abstracted away from mathematics because
freedom is free of form and it cannot be counted nor measured. ⋄
Comment Although in mathematics we cannot deal with freedom, it is an essential
part of problems, see §2.1. In any case, what defines problem π is its condition Ppi.
§3.1.9 Lemma The name of the free variable is not important, it can be replaced:
x?P (x) = y?P (y).
Proof By the condition isomorphism, and §3.1.8, both problems, x?P (x) and y?P (y),
are equal, x?P (x) = y?P (y), because they have the same condition, P . ⋄
Comment This means that the rule of α-conversion stands for problem expressions.
See Curry & Feys (1958), Section 3D.
§3.1.10 Definition Let π and ρ be two problems. Then π∧ρ = x?Ppi(x)∧Pρ(x), and
π ∨ ρ = x?Ppi(x) ∨ Pρ(x), and π¯ = x?¬Ppi(x).
Comment In other words, Ppi∧ρ(x) = Ppi(x) ∧ Pρ(x), Ppi∨ρ(x) = Ppi(x) ∨ Pρ(x), and
Pp¯i(x) = ¬Ppi(x).
Comment This provides a way to compose, or decompose, problems.
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§3.1.11 Definition A problem τ is tautological if its condition is a tautology; Pτ is
a tautology, if ∀x, Pτ (x) = ⊤. A problem τ¯ is contradictory if its condition is a
contradiction; Pτ¯ is a contradiction, if ∀x, Pτ¯ (x) = ⊥.
Lemma Both τ and τ¯ are expressible.
Proof Because Pτ and Pτ¯ are effectively calculable, see §3.1.6 and §3.1.5. ⋄
§3.1.12 Theorem 〈P,∨,∧,¬, τ¯ , τ〉 is a Boolean algebra, where τ¯ is the neutral for ∨,
and τ is the neutral for ∧.
Proof Because Ppi(x) ∈ B. In detail, ∀π, ρ, σ ∈ P:
1o. (π ∨ ρ) ∨ σ = x?Ppi∨ρ(x) ∨ Pσ(x) = x? (Ppi(x) ∨ Pρ(x)) ∨ Pσ(x) =
x?Ppi(x) ∨ (Pρ(x) ∨ Pσ(x)) = x?Ppi(x) ∨ Pρ∨σ(x) = π ∨ (ρ ∨ σ).
1a. (π ∧ ρ) ∧ σ = x?Ppi∧ρ(x) ∧ Pσ(x) = x? (Ppi(x) ∧ Pρ(x)) ∧ Pσ(x) =
x?Ppi(x) ∧ (Pρ(x) ∧ Pσ(x)) = x?Ppi(x) ∧ Pρ∧σ(x) = π ∧ (ρ ∧ σ).
2o. π ∨ ρ = x?Ppi(x) ∨ Pρ(x) = x?Pρ(x) ∨ Ppi(x) = ρ ∨ π.
2a. π ∧ ρ = x?Ppi(x) ∧ Pρ(x) = x?Pρ(x) ∧ Ppi(x) = ρ ∧ π.
3o. π ∨ τ¯ = x?Ppi(x) ∨ Pτ¯ (x) = x?Ppi(x) ∨ ⊥ = x?Ppi(x) = π.
3a. π ∧ τ = x?Ppi(x) ∧ Pτ (x) = x?Ppi(x) ∧ ⊤ = x?Ppi(x) = π.
4o. π ∨ π¯ = x?Ppi(x) ∨ Pp¯i(x) = x?Ppi(x) ∨ ¬Ppi(x) = x?⊤ = x?Pτ (x) = τ .
4a. π ∧ π¯ = x?Ppi(x) ∧ Pp¯i(x) = x?Ppi(x) ∧ ¬Ppi(x) = x?⊥ = x?Pτ¯ (x) = τ¯ .
5o. π ∨ (ρ ∧ σ) = x?Ppi(x) ∨ Pρ∧σ(x) = x?Ppi(x) ∨ (Pρ(x) ∧ Pσ(x)) =
x? (Ppi(x)∨Pρ(x))∧ (Ppi(x)∨Pσ(x)) = x?Ppi∨ρ(x)∧Ppi∨σ(x) = (π ∨ ρ)∧ (π ∨ σ).
5a. π ∧ (ρ ∨ σ) = x?Ppi(x) ∧ Pρ∨σ(x) = x?Ppi(x) ∧ (Pρ(x) ∨ Pσ(x)) =
x? (Ppi(x)∧Pρ(x))∨ (Ppi(x)∧Pσ(x)) = x?Ppi∧ρ(x)∨Ppi∧σ(x) = (π ∧ ρ)∨ (π ∧ σ).
⋄
§3.2 Solutions
§3.2.1 Theorem Everything is in S. In other words, S is the set of everything.
Proof Anything, let us call it s, is a solution to problem x? [x = s], because equality
is reflexive, and therefore everything satisfies the condition of being equal to itself. ⋄
Comment Freedom is complete, because x is free to take any value; x ∈ S is not a
restriction. And Ppi : S→ B is a predicate on everything.
Comment Some paradoxes derive from this theorem, see §3.2.12. For a constructive
vision of S, see Section §5. See also Subsection §6.2.
Corollary P ⊂ S and R ⊂ S. Even B ⊂ S.
Comment If you are a teacher looking for a problem to ask in an exam, then your
solution is a problem, so P ⊂ S makes sense. And if you are a mathematician looking
for an algorithm to resolve some kind of problems, then your solution is a resolution,
so R ⊂ S makes sense. There are many yes-or-no questions, so B ⊂ S makes sense.
§3.2.2 Notation Let Σpi be the (possibly infinite) set of all the solutions to problem
π. So Σpi ⊆ S, or Σpi ∈ 2S, and Σpi = { s | Ppi(s) }.
Comment A solution of the problem is any use of freedom that satisfies the condition,
see Section §2, so s is a solution of problem π, if Ppi(s) stands.
Comment The condition of the problem π is the characteristic function of its set of
solutions, that is, Ppi is the characteristic function of Σpi.
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§3.2.3 Lemma Σpi∨ρ = Σpi ∪ Σρ, and Σpi∧ρ = Σpi ∩ Σρ, and Σp¯i = Σpi.
Proof Just apply the definitions in §3.1.10:
Σpi∨ρ = { s | Ppi∨ρ(s) } = { s | Ppi(s) ∨ Pρ(s) } = { s | s ∈ Σpi ∨ s ∈ Σρ } = Σpi ∪ Σρ.
Σpi∧ρ = { s | Ppi∧ρ(s) } = { s | Ppi(s) ∧ Pρ(s) } = { s | s ∈ Σpi ∧ s ∈ Σρ } = Σpi ∩ Σρ.
Σp¯i = { s | Pp¯i(s) } = { s | ¬Ppi(s) } = { s | s /∈ Σpi } = Σpi. ⋄
§3.2.4 Lemma For a tautological problem, x?Pτ (x), everything is a solution, Στ = S.
For a contradictory problem, x?Pτ¯ (x), nothing is a solution, Στ¯ = ∅.
Proof Στ = { s | Pτ (s) } = { s | ⊤ } = S. Στ¯ = { s | Pτ¯ (s) } = { s | ⊥ } = {} = ∅. ⋄
§3.2.5 Lemma Σpi ∪ Σp¯i = S and Σpi ∩ Σp¯i = ∅.
Proof Σpi ∪Σp¯i = { s | Ppi(s) }∪ { s | ¬Ppi(s) } = { s | Ppi(s)∨¬Ppi(s) } = { s | ⊤ } = S.
Σpi ∩ Σp¯i = { s | Ppi(s) } ∩ { s | ¬Ppi(s) } = { s | Ppi(s) ∧ ¬Ppi(s) } = { s | ⊥ } = ∅. ⋄
§3.2.6 Lemma The solutions of π ∧ ρ are solutions of π and of ρ.
Proof ∀s ∈ S; s ∈ Σpi∧ρ ⇔ s ∈ Σpi ∩ Σρ ⇔ s ∈ Σpi ∧ s ∈ Σρ. ⋄
Comment The reader is free to explore this Boolean landscape, but here we will close
with the following theorems.
§3.2.7 Theorem 〈2S,∪,∩,−, ∅, S〉 is a Boolean algebra, where ∅ is the neutral for ∪,
and S is the neutral for ∩.
Proof The powerset of a set M , with the operations of union ∪, intersection ∩, and
complement with respect to setM , noted Q, is a typical example of a Boolean algebra.
In detail, ∀Q,R, S ∈ 2S:
1o. (Q ∪ R) ∪ S = Q ∪ (R ∪ S). 1a. (Q ∩R) ∩ S = Q ∩ (R ∩ S).
2o. Q ∪ R = R ∪Q. 2a. Q ∩R = R ∩Q.
3o. Q ∪ ∅ = Q. 3a. Q ∩ S = Q.
4o. Q ∪Q = S. 4a. Q ∩Q = ∅.
5o. Q ∪ (R ∩ S) = (Q ∪ R) ∩ (Q ∪ S). 5a. Q ∩ (R ∪ S) = (Q ∩ R) ∪ (Q ∩ S). ⋄
§3.2.8 Theorem 〈P,∨,∧,¬, τ¯ , τ〉 is isomorphic to 〈2S,∪,∩,−, ∅, S〉, that is, P ∼= 2S.
Proof We define the bijection Σ that relates each problem π with the set of its solutions
Σpi: for every problem π ∈ P there is a set, the set of its solutions, Σpi ∈ 2S, and
for every set S ∈ 2S there is a problem, πS = x? [x ∈ S], where πS ∈ P. Now, by
Lemma §3.2.3, the bijection translates properly all three operations, ∨ ↔ ∪, ∧ ↔ ∩,
¬ ↔ −, and, by Lemma §3.2.4, also the two neutrals, τ¯ ↔ ∅, τ ↔ S. ⋄
Comment We will call P ∼= 2S the set isomorphism. That is, P⇔ 2S : π ↔ Σpi.
Comment Using the set isomorphism, two problems are equal if they have the same
solutions, that is, π = ρ⇔ Σpi = Σρ.
§3.2.9 Theorem The set of problems is equal to the powerset of the solutions, that is,
P = 2S.
Proof The equality P = 2S derives directly from the set isomorphism P ∼= 2S, see
§3.2.8, because no property was abstracted out. ⋄
§3.2.10 Definition The set of singletons is: S1 = {S ∈ 2S | [ |S| = 1 ] }.
Proposition S1 ⊂ 2S, because ∀S ∈ S1, S ∈ 2S, but ∅ ∈ 2S and ∅ /∈ S1.
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§3.2.11 Definition The singleton isomorphism is the isomorphism between S and S1
that relates each s ∈ S to the set {s} ∈ S1, and the converse. That is, S ∼= S1, and
S⇔ S1 : s↔ {s}.
Comment We can extend any operation on S to S1. For example, for any binary
operation ∗ on S, we define {a} ∗ {b} = {a ∗ b}.
Comment From the singleton isomorphism: S ∼= S1 ⊂ 2S.
§3.2.12 Lemma The set of solutions S is a proper subset of the set of problems P, that
is, S ⊂ P.
Proof By the singleton isomorphism, see §3.2.11, S ∼= S1, and, by the set isomorphism,
see §3.2.8, for each singleton there is a problem, so S1 ⊂ P, and then S ∼= S1 ⊂ P. ⋄
Paradox We have both, S ⊂ P and, by §3.2.1, P ⊂ S.
Comment If we only accept computable functions and computable sets, then S∗ 6⊂ P∗,
see Subsection §6.2.
§3.2.13 Definition A problem π is solved if a solution of π is known.
Comment To solve a problem, given the set of its solutions Σpi, a choice function
fc : 2
S \ ∅ → S is needed.
§3.2.14 Definition A problem is unsolvable if Σpi = {} = ∅, that is, if |Σpi| = 0. A
problem is solvable if |Σpi| > 0.
Comment If a problem has not any solution, then it is unsolvable. If a problem has a
solution, then it can be solved. A problem is solvable if it can be solved.
Comment Solved implies solvable, but not the converse: Solved⇒ Solvable.
§3.3 Routines and Trials
§3.3.1 Definition We will refer to the routine of problem π as Rpi. The routine is the
set of the solutions to the problem, a set that is known, see §2.3. Then Rpi = Σpi.
Comment The routine of problem π, Rpi, is then, or an extensive definition of Σpi,
Σpi = {s1, . . . , sn}, or a procedure P that generates all problem π solutions and then
halts. If the number of solutions is infinite, |Σpi| ≥ ℵ0, then Rpi has to be a procedure
P that keeps generating solutions forever.
§3.3.2 Definition A trial on problem π over the set of possible solutions S, written
Tpi(S), returns the set of those elements in S that satisfy the problem condition Ppi,
see §2.3. Then Tpi(S) = { s ∈ S | Ppi(s) }.
Comment Mathematically we will ignore the practical problem of governing the trial.
Practically we will need a halt condition to truncate the calculations that are too
long (or infinite), and some ordering on the tests to fit the execution of the tests to
the available calculating machinery.
§3.3.3 Definition To test if a possible solution s ∈ S is a solution to problem π, is to
replace the free variable with s. So, being π = x?Ppi(x), then to test if s is a solution
is to calculate Ppi(s).
Comment Testing is a calculation S→ B.
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§3.3.4 Remark Replacing variables in expressions requires not confusing free with
bound variables, nor bound with free variables.
Comment This means that the rule of β-conversion and the rules γ for substitution
stand for testing. See Curry & Feys (1958), Section 3D for β-conversion, and Sec-
tion 3E for substitution (the rules γ).
§3.3.5 Theorem A trial on problem π over the set S is equal to the intersection of S
with the set of the solutions Σpi, that is, Tpi(S) = S ∩ Σpi.
Proof Tpi(S) = { s ∈ S | Ppi(s) } = { s | s ∈ S ∧ Ppi(s) } = { s | s ∈ S ∧ s ∈ Σpi } =
{ s | s ∈ S } ∩ { s | s ∈ Σpi } = S ∩ Σpi. ⋄
Corollary Any trial is a subset of the set of solutions, Tpi(S) ⊆ Σpi.
Proof Tpi(S) = S ∩ Σpi ⊆ Σpi. ⋄
Corollary Any trial is a subset of the routine, that is, Tpi(S) ⊆ Σpi = Rpi.
§3.3.6 Lemma If S is a superset of Σpi, then a trial on problem π over S is equal to
Σpi, and the converse, that is, Σpi ⊆ S ⇔ Tpi(S) = Σpi.
Proof Σpi ⊆ S ⇔ S ∩ Σpi = Σpi ⇔ Tpi(S) = Σpi, using Theorem §3.3.5. ⋄
Corollary If S is a superset of Σpi, then a trial on problem π over S is equal to the
routine of π, and the converse, that is, Σpi ⊆ S ⇔ Tpi(S) = Rpi.
Proof Σpi ⊆ S ⇔ S ∩ Σpi = Σpi ⇔ Tpi(S) = Rpi. ⋄
Corollary A trial on problem π over the whole S is equal to Σpi, that is, Tpi(S) = Σpi.
Proof Because Σpi ⊆ S. ⋄
Comment Tpi(S) is an exhaustive search.
§3.3.7 Theorem The routine is a trial over all the solutions, that is, Rpi = Tpi(Σpi).
Proof By Theorem §3.3.5, Tpi(Σpi) = Σpi ∩ Σpi = Σpi = Rpi. ⋄
Comment Tpi(Rpi) = Tpi(Σpi) = Σpi = Rpi.
§3.4 Analogies
§3.4.1 Definition If A is an analogy, and π = x?Ppi(x) is a problem, then Aπ is
another problem Aπ = x?PApi(x). That is, A : P→ P.
Comment So analogies transform a condition into a condition, Ppi into PApi in this
example.
Comment Taking advantage of problem decomposition, see §3.1.10, the result of an
analogy, Aπ, can be a composition of problems that are easier to resolve than the
original problem, π, see §2.3.
§3.4.2 Definition If Σpi = ΣApi, then we say that the analogy is conservative.
Comment If an analogy is not conservative, then a function TA to translate ΣApi to Σpi
is required, because otherwise the analogy would be useless.
§3.4.3 Notation We will call function TA the translating function of analogy A.
TA : 2S → 2S and TA(ΣApi) = Σpi.
§3.4.4 Lemma An analogy followed by another one is an analogy.
Proof Because any analogy transforms a problem into a problem: P→ P. ⋄
Corollary Analogies can be chained.
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§3.4.5 Lemma Using only analogies we cannot resolve any problem.
Proof Because using analogies we only get problems. ⋄
Comment While routines R and trials T (S) are functions that return a set, P → 2S,
analogies A are functions that return a function, P→ P.
§3.4.6 Notation We will write A ◦ T to express the composition of functions, where
A is applied first and then T .
Comment [A ◦ T ](x) = T (A(x)). Diagram: x A−−→A(x) T−−→T (A(x)).
Comment If A1 and A2 are analogies, then A1◦A2 is also an analogy, by Lemma §3.4.4.
§3.4.7 Definition To resolve a problem by analogy A is to compose A◦ℜ◦TA, where
ℜ is any resolution, and TA is the translating function of A. Diagrams:
π
A−−→Aπ ℜ−−→ΣApi TA−−→Σpi or P A−−→P ℜ−−→ 2S TA−−→ 2S .
Comment Analogy A is a translation from some original problem domain to some
analogue problem domain. Then, by Lemma §3.4.5, we need a resolution ℜ to resolve
the analogue problem. And, finally, we need to translate the solutions back to the
original domain.
§3.4.8 Lemma The translating function of the composition A ◦ A′ is TA′ ◦ TA.
Proof If ℜ = A′ ◦ℜ′ ◦ TA′ then we get A ◦ (A′ ◦ℜ′ ◦ TA′) ◦ TA = A ◦A′ ◦ℜ′ ◦ TA′ ◦ TA =
(A ◦ A′) ◦ ℜ′ ◦ (TA′ ◦ TA), because function composition is associative. Diagram:
P
A−−→P A′−−→P ℜ′−−→ 2S TA′−−−→ 2S︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℜ
TA−−→ 2S. ⋄
Corollary The translating function of the composition A1 ◦A2 . . . ◦An is TAn ◦ . . . ◦
TA2 ◦ TA1. That is: TA1◦A2...◦An = TAn ◦ . . . ◦ TA2 ◦ TA1 .
Comment This is how analogies can be chained.
§3.4.9 Definition The identity function, written I, transforms anything into itself:
∀x, I(x) = x.
Comment The identity function I is an effectively calculable function, see §3.1.5. It is
λ-definable; in λ-calculus, I = (λx.x).
Comment Identity I transforms π into π, I(π) = π, and Ppi into Ppi, I(Ppi) = Ppi.
Comment Identity I can work as an analogy: Iπ = I(π) = π.
§3.4.10 Lemma The translating function of the identity analogy is the identity function:
TI = I.
Proof Because I(Σpi) = Σpi. Diagram: π
I−→π ℜ−−→Σpi I−→Σpi. ⋄
Comment The identity analogy is conservative, see §3.4.2.
§3.4.11 Lemma The identity I followed by any function f , or any function f followed
by identity I, is equal to the function: ∀f, I ◦ f = f = f ◦ I.
Proof ∀f, ∀x, [I ◦ f ](x) = f(I(x)) = f(x) = I(f(x)) = [f ◦ I](x). ⋄
Comment I ◦ ℜ(Iπ) ◦ TI = I ◦ ℜ(π) ◦ I = ℜ(π).
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§3.4.12 Theorem A ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TA, where A is an analogy, TApi(S) is a trial, and TA is
the translating function of A, is the general form of a resolution.
Proof If the analogy is the identity I, then the general form is reduced to Tpi(S),
because TI = I, Iπ = π, so I◦TIpi(S)◦I = Tpi(S), which is a trial. By Theorem §3.3.7,
a routine is a specific trial, Rpi = Tpi(Rpi), so I ◦ Tpi(Rpi) ◦ I = Tpi(Rpi) = Rpi reduces
the general form to the routine. Resolving by analogy is, by definition, A ◦ ℜ ◦ TA,
and analogies can be chained, by Lemma §3.4.4, so a chain of analogies is an analogy,
A1◦A2◦ . . .◦An = A, and by Lemma §3.4.8, TA = TA1◦A2◦...◦An = TAn ◦ . . .◦TA2 ◦TA1 .
Then A1 ◦ A2 ◦ . . . ◦ An ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TAn ◦ . . . ◦ TA2 ◦ TA1 = A ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TA. ⋄
Summary There are three ways to resolve a problem: routine Rpi = I ◦Tpi(Rpi)◦ I, trial
Tpi(S) = I◦Tpi(S)◦I, and analogy A1◦. . .◦An◦TApi(S)◦TAn◦. . .◦TA1 = A◦TApi(S)◦TA.
§3.5 Metaproblems
§3.5.1 Definition A resolution ℜ : P → 2S is a valid resolution for a problem π if
it finds all the solutions of problem π and then halts. In other words, ℜ is a valid
resolution for π if it satisfies two conditions: that ℜ(π) is effectively calculable, and
that ℜ fits problem π, that is, that ℜ(π) = Σpi.
Comment If Σpi is infinite, |Σpi| ≥ ℵ0, then a valid ℜ(π) does not halt, but it keeps
building Σpi forever.
§3.5.2 Definition A problem π is resolved if a valid resolution for π is known.
Comment To solve a problem we have to find one solution, see §3.2.13. To resolve a
problem we have to find all the solutions. To resolve a problem is to exhaust the
problem.
§3.5.3 Lemma Once a problem is resolved, we can thereafter resolve it by routine.
Proof Once a problem is resolved, we know all of its solutions, Σpi, and knowing Σpi,
we know its routine resolution, because Rpi = Σpi, see §3.3.1. ⋄
Proposition If π ∧ ρ is solvable, then by resolving π ∧ ρ both π and ρ are solved.
§3.5.4 Definition A problem is resolvable if there is a valid resolution for the problem,
see §3.5.1, that is, if there is a resolution ℜ such that ℜ(π) is effectively calculable,
and ℜ(π) = Σpi. Otherwise, the problem is unresolvable.
Comment A problem is resolvable if it can be resolved.
Comment Resolved implies resolvable, but not the converse: Resolved⇒ Resolvable.
§3.5.5 Definition For any Boolean-valued function P : S→ B, we define the function
Pˇ : B→ 2S, called the inverse of condition P , as follows:
Pˇ (⊤) = { x | [P (x) = ⊤] },
Pˇ (⊥) = { x | [P (x) = ⊥] }.
§3.5.6 Lemma If Ppi(x) is the condition of a problem π, then Pˇpi(⊤) = Σpi and
Pˇpi(⊥) = Σpi = Σp¯i.
Proof Because Pˇpi(⊤) = { x | [Ppi(x) = ⊤] } = { x | Ppi(x) } = Σpi, and
Pˇpi(⊥) = { x | [Ppi(x) = ⊥] } = { x | ¬Ppi(x) } = Σpi = Σp¯i, by Lemma §3.2.3. ⋄
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§3.5.7 Theorem The inverse of the condition of a problem, provided it is an effectively
calculable function, resolves the problem and its complementary by routine.
Proof By §3.5.6 and §3.3.1, Pˇpi(⊤) = Σpi = Rpi, then Pˇpi(⊤) is the routine resolution of
π, if Pˇpi(⊤) is effectively calculable, see §3.1.5. And if Pˇpi(⊥) is effectively calculable,
then it resolves the complementary problem by routine, Pˇpi(⊥) = Σp¯i = Rp¯i. ⋄
Comment It is a nice theorem, but how can we find the inverse of a condition?
§3.5.8 Definition The metaproblem of a problem, written Ππ, is the problem of
finding the valid resolutions for problem π. In other words, if π = x?Ppi(x), then
Ππ = ℜ? [ℜ(π) = Σpi].
Comment The solutions of the metaproblems are the resolutions, ΠS = R.
Comment The condition of the metaproblem, PΠpi, is [ℜ(π) = Σpi], that is, PΠpi(ℜ) =
[ℜ(π) = Σpi], or using an α-conversion, PΠpi(x) = [x(π) = Σpi].
§3.5.9 Lemma A metaproblem is a problem, that is, ΠP ⊂ P.
Proof Because Ππ = x?PΠpi(x), but some problems are not metaproblems. ⋄
Comment A metaproblem is a problem because it has its two ingredients: there are
several ways to resolve a problem, so there is freedom, but only the valid resolutions
resolve the problem, so there is a condition.
§3.5.10 Definition The metacondition PΠ is PΠ(p, r) = [r(p) = Σp], for any problem
p ∈ P, and for any resolution r ∈ R.
Comment Using another α-conversion, PΠ(π, x) = [x(π) = Σpi] = PΠpi(x).
Comment Ππ = x?PΠ(π, x).
§3.5.11 Definition Metaresolving is resolving the metaproblem to resolve the prob-
lem.
Comment Metaresolving is a kind of analogy. Diagram:
π
Π−−→Ππ Πℜ−−−→ΣΠpi = {ℜ | [ℜ(π) = Σpi] } fc−−→ℜc (pi)−−→ℜc(π) = Σpi .
Function fc is a choice function, and the last calculation, noted (π), means to apply
π as the argument, not as the function. If you only metasolve, then you don’t need
to choose. In any case, the translating function of metaresolving is TΠ = fc ◦ (π).
Then we can draw the following diagrams:
π
Π−−→Ππ Πℜ−−−→ΣΠpi TΠ−−→Σpi or P Π−−→ΠP Πℜ−−−→ 2ΠS = 2R TΠ−−→ 2S .
§3.5.12 Lemma The metaproblem Ππ of some problem π is solvable if, and only if, the
problem π is resolvable, that is, Ππ is solvable⇔ π is resolvable.
Proof If Ππ is solvable, then there is a solution to it, see §3.2.14, and that solution
is a valid resolution for π, see §3.5.8, and then π is resolvable, see §3.5.4. If π is
resolvable, then there is a valid resolution for it, see §3.5.4, and that resolution is a
solution of its metaproblem Ππ, see §3.5.8, and then Ππ is solvable, see §3.2.14. ⋄
Corollary To solve the metaproblem Ππ of problem π is to resolve problem π.
Proof Because to resolve problem π is to find a valid resolution for π, see §3.5.2, and
to solve the metaproblem Ππ is to find a solution to Ππ, see §3.2.13, which is also to
find a valid resolution for π, see §3.5.8. ⋄
Comment And again, R = ΠS.
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§3.5.13 Lemma The set of the valid resolutions for problem π is the routine resolution
of its metaproblem Ππ, that is, {ℜ | [ℜ(π) = Σpi] } = RΠpi.
Proof RΠpi = ΣΠpi, by the definition of routine, see §3.3.1.
And ΣΠpi = {ℜ | [ℜ(π) = Σpi] }, by the definition of Ππ, see §3.5.8. ⋄
§3.6 Resolution Typology
§3.6.1 Definition The metan-metaproblem of π, ΠnΠπ, is (the metaproblem of)n the
metaproblem of π, where n ∈ N.
Special case The meta-metaproblem of π, ΠΠπ = Π1Ππ, is the metaproblem of the
metaproblem of π.
Examples Π0Ππ = Ππ. Π1Ππ = ΠΠπ = Π2π. Π2Ππ = ΠΠΠπ = Π3π.
Comment From ΠS = R, we get ΠΠS = ΠR and ΠnΠS = ΠnR.
Comment The condition of the metan-metaproblem of π, PΠnΠpi, where n ∈ N, is:
PΠnΠpi(x) = [x(Π
nπ) = ΣΠnpi].
Examples PΠ0Πpi(x) = [x(Π
0π) = ΣΠ0pi] = [x(π) = Σpi] = PΠpi(x).
PΠ1Πpi(x) = [x(Π
1π) = ΣΠ1pi] = [x(Ππ) = ΣΠpi] = PΠΠpi(x).
§3.6.2 Lemma A metan-metaproblem is a problem, where n ∈ N.
Proof If n > 0, then ΠnΠπ = x?PΠnΠpi(x). For n = 0, see §3.5.9. ⋄
Corollary
⋃
n∈N Π
nΠP ⊂ P.
§3.6.3 Definition The metan-metacondition PΠnΠ, with n ∈ N, p ∈ P, and r ∈ R is:
PΠnΠ(p, r) = [r(Π
np) = ΣΠnp].
Comment Using an α-conversion, PΠnΠ(π, x) = [x(Π
nπ) = ΣΠnpi] = PΠnΠpi(x).
Example PΠ1Π(π, x) = PΠΠ(π, x) = [x(Ππ) = ΣΠpi] = [x(Π
1π) = ΣΠ1pi].
§3.6.4 Lemma PΠnΠ(π, x) = PΠ(Πnπ, x), where n ∈ N.
Proof By §3.5.10, PΠ(Πnπ, x) = [x(Πnπ) = ΣΠnpi] = PΠnΠ(π, x). ⋄
Special Case PΠΠ(π, x) = PΠ(Ππ, x).
Comment The meta-metacondition is the metacondition of the metaproblem.
§3.6.5 Lemma A metan-metaproblem is a metaproblem, where n ∈ N.
Proof If n > 0, ΠnΠπ = x?PΠ(Π
nπ, x), and Π0Ππ = Ππ = x?PΠ(π, x). ⋄
Corollary
⋃
n∈N Π
nΠP = ΠP.
§3.6.6 Lemma We have the following infinite series of mathematical objects:
S, P = 2S, R = ΠS = 2S → 2S, ΠP = 22S→2S , ΠR = ΠΠS = 22S→2S → 22S→2S , . . .
Proof P = S→ B = 2S, by Theorems §3.1.8 and §3.2.9.
ΠS = R, by the metaproblem definition, see §3.5.8, and R = P→ 2S = 2S → 2S.
ΠP = ΠS→ B = R→ B = 2R = 22S→2S .
ΠR = ΠP→ 2ΠS = 2R → 2R = 22S→2S → 22S→2S .
And so on. ⋄
§3.6.7 Theorem There is only one level of problem meta-ness.
Proof By Lemma §3.6.5, because every metan-metaproblem is a metaproblem, and
every metaproblem is a meta0-metaproblem, so
⋃
n∈NΠ
nΠP = ΠP ⊂ P. ⋄
Comment While a problem condition is any predicate, P (x), a metaproblem condition
is a specific kind of predicate, namely, PΠ(p, r) = [r(p) = Σp]. And any meta
n-
metaproblem condition, PΠnΠ, is the same specific predicate PΠ, see §3.6.4.
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Comment We are assuming that functions are free to take functions as arguments. See
that, in predicate PΠ(p, r) = [r(p) = Σp], argument r is a function in Π
nR that takes
p ∈ ΠnP as argument. Therefore, the theorem holds unconditionally for λ-definable
functions, including predicates, see §4.2.9. And then, under Church’s thesis, see
§4.3.1, the theorem is true for effectively calculable functions, and in particular, it is
true for expressible and for resolvable problems, see §3.1.6 and §3.5.4.
§3.6.8 Theorem There are five types of resolution.
Proof From Theorem §3.4.12 we get three types for the resolution of problems: Rpi,
Tpi(S), and A ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TA. This shows that there are several ways of resolving, so
choosing a resolution that find solutions to the original problem π is another problem,
the metaproblem Ππ, see §3.5.8. Then we should get another three for the resolution
of the metaproblem, but, by §3.5.13, the set of the resolutions of a problem is the
routine resolution of its metaproblem, so we only add two more for the metaproblem:
TΠpi(R), and A ◦ TAΠpi(R) ◦ TA. Finally, by §3.6.7, we do not need to go deeper into
metan-metaproblems. ⋄
Comment We will call them: routine Rpi, trial Tpi(S), analogy A ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TA, meta-
trial TΠpi(R), and meta-analogy A ◦ TAΠpi(R) ◦ TA. The first three can also be called
meta-routines.
§3.6.9 Remark The diagram for the meta-trial, or trial of the metaproblem, is:
π
Π−−→Ππ TΠpi(R)−−−−−→ΣΠpi TΠ−−→Σpi .
And the diagram for the meta-analogy, or analogy of the metaproblem, is:
π
Π−−→Ππ A−−→AΠπ TAΠpi(R)−−−−−−→ΣAΠpi TA−−→ΣΠpi TΠ−−→Σpi .
See that A : ΠP → ΠP = 22S→2S → 22S→2S and TA : 2ΠS → 2ΠS = 22S→2S → 22S→2S ,
using §3.6.6. Both are functions taking sets of functions on sets to sets and returning
sets of functions on sets to sets.
§4 Computers
§4.1 Turing Machine
§4.1.1 Definition A computation is any manipulation of a string of symbols, irrespec-
tive of the symbols meanings, but according to a finite set of well-defined rules.
Comment Computing is any mechanical transformation of a string of symbols.
§4.1.2 Definition A computing device, or computer, is any mechanism that can per-
form computations.
Comment The prototype of computing device is a Turing machine, see Turing (1936).
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§4.1.3 Notation The Turing machine has two parts: the processor P, which is a finite
state automaton, and an infinite tape, 〈 〉, which in any moment contains only a finite
number of symbols.
Comment In the case of a processor of a Turing machine, the output alphabet O, that
is, the finite set of output symbols, has to be: O = I+×{l, h, r}, where I is the finite
not empty input alphabet, I+ = I ∪ {b}, where b /∈ I is blank, and l, h, and r mean
left, halt, and right. Then its transition function is T : S × I+ → S × I+ × {l, h, r},
where S is the finite set of internal states. And the strings that the Turing machine
transforms are sequences of symbols taken from set I.
§4.1.4 Notation We will refer to the set of Turing machines as T. We will refer to
the set of the strings of symbols as E.
Comment Because all Turing machines tapes are equal, the processor defines the Tur-
ing machine, and therefore we will refer to the Turing machine with processor P as
the Turing machine P, and then P ∈ T. We will refer to the string of symbols written
on the tape as the expression e ∈ E.
§4.1.5 Lemma The set of expressions is countable, that is, |E| = |N| = ℵ0.
Proof Let I be any finite alphabet, and s its cardinality, that is, s is the number of
symbols, s = |I| > 0. We write In the set of strings of length n, so |In| = sn. Then
E =
⋃
n∈N I
n, and we can define a bijection between E and N this way: it maps the
empty string in I0 to 0, it maps the s strings in I1 to the next s numbers, it maps the
s2 strings in I2 to the next s2 numbers, and so on. Note that ordering the symbols
in I, we can order alphabetically the strings in each In. ⋄
Comment Most real numbers are not expressible. See Turing (1936) §10 for details;
but, for example, transcendental numbers π and e are computable, page 256.
§4.1.6 Notation We will use the notation P〈e〉 →֒ r to indicate that, if we write the
expression e ∈ E on the tape of the Turing machine with processor P and we leave
it running, then when it halts we will find the expression r ∈ E on the tape. If, on
the contrary, the Turing machine P does not halt when we write the expression w,
then we would say that w is a paradox in P, and we would indicate this as follows:
P〈w〉 →֒ ∞.
§4.1.7 Definition E+ = E ∪ {∞}.
Comment Some computations do not halt, so we need ∞ to refer to them. Note that
∞ /∈ E, but ∞ ∈ E+. So E ⊂ E+.
§4.1.8 Definition For each Turing machine P ∈ T we define a function FP : E→ E+,
this way:
FP(e) =
{
r if P〈e〉 →֒ r
∞ if P〈e〉 →֒ ∞ .
Comment If ∀e ∈ E, FP(e) = FQ(e), then we say that Turing machines P and Q are
behaviorally equivalent, P ≡F Q, or that P and Q implement the same function.
§4.1.9 Definition We say that a function is computable if there is a Turing machine
that implements the function.
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§4.1.10 Lemma For each Turing machine we can define a unique finite string of symbols,
that is, ∃c : T→ E such that P = Q ⇔ c(P) = c(Q).
Proof Proved by Turing (1936), §5. Turing machines are defined by their processors,
which are finite state automata. And every finite state automaton is defined by
the table that describes its transition function T in full, which is a finite table of
expressions referring to internal states, input symbols, and output symbols. A table
can be converted to a string just using an additional symbol for the end of line, and
another symbol for the end of cell. To assure uniqueness, we have to impose some
order on the lines and on the cells. ⋄
Comment c(P) ∈ E is the string of symbols that represents the Turing machine P ∈ T.
§4.1.11 Notation We will refer to p = c(P) as a program, and to the set of programs
as P. The set of programs is a proper subset of the set of expressions, P ⊂ E.
§4.1.12 Definition The program isomorphism is the natural isomorphism that relates
each Turing machine P ∈ T with the expression describing it, c(P) = p ∈ P. That
is, T⇔ P : P ↔ c(P).
Comment Now, T ∼= P ⊂ E.
§4.1.13 Lemma The set of Turing machines is countable, that is, |T| = |N| = ℵ0.
Proof Proved by Turing (1936), §5. Using the program isomorphism, see §4.1.12, we
order the Turing machines according to its corresponding program p = c(P). We can
order the programs, because they are finite strings of symbols, for example first by
length, and then those of a given length by some kind of alphabetical order. Once
ordered, we can assign a natural number to each one. ⋄
§4.1.14 Theorem All computing sets are countable, that is, |T| = |E| = ℵ0.
Proof By Lemmas §4.1.5 and §4.1.13. ⋄
Comment All computing is about countable sets. Computing is counting.
§4.2 Turing Completeness
§4.2.1 Theorem There is a Turing machine, called universal Turing machine, U , that
can compute anything that any Turing machine can compute. That is:
∃U ∈ T | ∀P ∈ T, ∀d ∈ E, U〈c(P) d〉 = P〈d〉.
Proof Proved by Turing (1936), §6 and §7. ⋄
Comment The equality means that if P〈d〉 →֒ r then U〈c(P) d〉 →֒ r, and the converse,
and also that if P〈d〉 →֒ ∞ then U〈c(P) d〉 →֒ ∞, and the converse. That is,
U〈c(P)〉 ≡F P. To complete the definition, if e /∈ P, then U〈e d〉 →֒ e d.
§4.2.2 Notation We will refer to the set of universal Turing machines as U.
Comment The set of universal Turing machines is a proper subset of the set of Turing
machines, U ⊂ T.
§4.2.3 Lemma For each universal Turing machine U there is a universal program u.
Proof Universal Turing machines are Turing machines, and u = c(U). Then, by the
program isomorphism, see §4.1.12, u = U . ⋄
Comment Given u = c(U) and p = c(P), then U〈p d〉 = P〈d〉 and U〈u p d〉 = U〈p d〉,
so u is the identity for programs, and U〈u u p d〉 = U〈u p d〉 = U〈p d〉 = P〈d〉.
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§4.2.4 Definition The terminating condition Pσ : T→ B is:
Pσ(P) =
{⊥ if ∃w ∈ E, P〈w〉 →֒ ∞
⊤ otherwise .
Comment A terminating Turing machine always halts. There are not paradoxes in a
terminating Turing machine. While Turing machines implement partial functions,
E→ E+, see §4.1.8, terminating Turing machines implement total functions, E→ E.
§4.2.5 Definition The terminating problem is σ = p?Pσ(p).
The non-terminating problem is σ¯ = p? ¬Pσ(p).
Comment The terminating problem follows from the condition isomorphism of prob-
lems, see §3.1.7, applied to the terminating condition Pσ.
The non-terminating problem is derived from the terminating one by negation, see
§3.1.10.
Comment The set of terminating Turing machines is Σσ,
and the set of non-terminating Turing machines is Σσ¯.
Proposition Σσ and Σσ¯ are a partition of T, because Σσ ∩Σσ¯ = ∅ and Σσ ∪Σσ¯ = T.
§4.2.6 Definition We will call a = c(Pσ) ∈ E, where Pσ ∈ Σσ, an algorithm.
Comment ∀d, Pσ〈d〉 →֒ r 6=∞ ⇔ ∀d, U〈a d〉 →֒ r 6=∞.
Comment An algorithm is the expression of a computation that always halts.
Notation We will refer to the set of algorithms as A.
Comment A ⊂ P ⊂ E.
§4.2.7 Lemma Universal Turing machines are non-terminating, that is, U ⊂ Σσ¯ ⊂ T.
Proof Because there are paradoxes in some Turing machines. For example, for Turing
machine W, that has not any h (halt) in its transition table, every expression is a
paradox. That is, ∃P ∈ T, ∃w ∈ E, P〈w〉 →֒ ∞ ⇒ ∀U ∈ U, U〈c(P) w〉 →֒ ∞. ⋄
Comment If expression w is a paradox in P, then expression c(P) w is a paradox in
U . Then, U ∈ Σσ¯.
§4.2.8 Definition A computing device is Turing complete if it can compute what-
ever any Turing machine can compute. We will call every Turing complete device a
universal computer.
Comment The prototype of universal computer is a universal Turing machine, U .
Comment The Turing machine, as it was presented by Turing (1936), models the
calculations done by a person. This means that we can compute whatever any Turing
machine can compute provided we have enough time and memory, and therefore we
are Turing complete provided we have enough time and memory.
§4.2.9 Theorem All universal computers are equivalent.
Proof Go¨del and Herbrand recursiveness, Church λ-definability, and Turing com-
putability are equivalent, because Kleene (1936) showed that every recursive function
is λ-definable, and the converse, and then Turing (1937) showed that every λ-definable
function is computable, and that every computable function is recursive. ⋄
Comment A universal Turing machine is equivalent to a λ-calculus interpreter, where
a λ-calculus interpreter is a device that can perform any λ-calculus reduction. A
universal Turing machine is equivalent to a mathematician calculating formally, and
without errors, any recursive function.
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Comment The universal Turing machine, the λ-calculus interpreter, and the mathe-
matician, who is a person, are equal in computing power. And all of them are Turing
complete.
§4.2.10 Proviso Whenever we apply a general statement to a finite universal comput-
ing device, we should add a cautious ‘provided it has enough time and memory’.
Comment Although the finite universal computer can perform each and every step of
the computation exactly the same as the unrestricted universal computer, the finite
universal computer could meet some limitations of time or memory that would prevent
it to complete the computation. In that case, the same finite universal computer,
provided with some additional time and some more memory, would perform some
more computing steps exactly the same as the unrestricted universal computer. This
extension procedure can be repeated as desired to close the gap between the finite
and the unrestricted universal computer.
Comment We will understand that the proviso ‘provided it has enough time and mem-
ory’ is implicitly stated whenever we refer to a finite universal computing device.
§4.2.11 Convention Because all universal computers are equivalent, we can use any
of them, let us call the one used U , and then drop every U from the formulas, and just
examine expressions, that is, elements in E. In case we need to note a non-halting
computation, we will use ∞.
Comment Using the convention is as if we were always looking inside the tape of
U . Given a universal computer, U , computing is about expressions manipulating
expressions.
Example Formula U〈c(P) d〉 →֒ r is reduced to 〈c(P) d〉 →֒ r, and even to 〈p d〉 →֒ r,
using the rewriting rule: ∀P ∈ T, c(P) = p. If the universal computer is a λ-calculus
interpreter, then this is usually written as the β-reduction (p d) → r, where the left
hand side is a λ-application, and p is defined by some λ-abstraction.
§4.2.12 Definition For each program p ∈ P we define a function Fp : E → E+, this
way:
Fp(e) =
{
r if 〈p e〉 →֒ r
∞ if 〈p e〉 →֒ ∞ .
Comment If ∀e ∈ E, Fp(e) = Fq(e), then we say that programs p and q are behaviorally
equivalent, p ≡F q, or that p and q implement the same function.
§4.2.13 Theorem ∀P ∈ T, FP = Fp, where p = c(P).
Proof ∀d ∈ E, ∀P ∈ T, Fp(d) = FP(d), see §4.1.8, because U〈c(P) d〉 = P〈d〉, by
Theorem §4.2.1, and therefore FP = Fp when the universal computer is a universal
Turing machine, U . Theorem §4.2.9 extends it to every universal computer. ⋄
Comment P and p implement the same function.
Comment This theorem is a consequence of the program isomorphism, see §4.1.12. In
other words, T ∼= P implies that ≡F ↔ ≡F, so P ≡F Q ⇔ p ≡F q.
Corollary FU = Fu, where u = c(U).
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§4.3 Turing’s Thesis
§4.3.1 Thesis What is effectively calculable is computable.
Comment This is Church’s thesis, or rather Turing’s thesis, as it was expressed by
Gandy (1980). There, ‘something is effectively calculable’ if its results can be found
by some purely mechanical process, see §3.1.5, and ‘computable’ means that the same
results will be found by some Turing machine. Then, ∗F ⊆ T.
Comment ‘What is computable is effectively calculable’, or T ⊆ ∗F, is the converse of
Turing’s thesis. And it is obvious that if a Turing machine can compute a function,
then the function is effectively calculable, see §3.1.5, by a Turing machine. Therefore,
∗F = T, and |∗F| = ℵ0, by §4.1.13.
§4.3.2 Remark An effectively calculable function is not an input to output mapping;
it is a process to calculate the output from the input.
Example To multiply a number expressed in binary by two we can append a ‘0’ to it,
which is an effectively calculable function that we will call app0. But the complete
memoization of the same function, which we will call memoby2, is not effectively
calculable because it would require an infinite quantity of memory. And therefore,
app0 6= memoby2.
§4.3.3 Notation We will call every universe where the Turing’s thesis is true a Turing
universe. When we want to note that something is true in a Turing universe, we will
use an asterisk, so A
∗
= B means that A = B if the Turing’s thesis stands.
Examples ∗F
∗
= T and |∗F| ∗= ℵ0.
Comment The Turing’s thesis affirms that this is a Turing universe. In any Turing
universe the Turing’s thesis is a law of nature, as it was defended by Post (1936), last
paragraph. Then a Turing universe can also be called a Post universe.
Comment While the Turing’s thesis is true, you can ignore the asterisks.
§4.3.4 Theorem Universal computers are* the most capable computing devices.
Proof If Turing’s thesis stands, see §4.3.1, then anything that any mechanism can
effectively calculate can be computed by some Turing machine, and therefore, by
Theorem §4.2.1, it can be computed by any universal Turing machine, and finally, by
Theorem §4.2.9, it can be computed by any universal computer. ⋄
§4.3.5 Lemma There are definable functions that no Turing machine can compute.
Proof You can use a diagonal argument, or work from other theorems that use the
diagonal argument. For example, the set of Turing machines is countable, see §4.1.13,
|T| = |N| = ℵ0, while the possible number of predicates on natural numbers, that is,
the number of functions N → B, is 2|N| = 2ℵ0, which is not countable, |T| = |N| =
ℵ0 < 2ℵ0 = 2|N|. This uses Cantor’s theorem, |S| < |2S|, with its diagonal argument.
So there are not enough Turing machines to compute every definable function. ⋄
Corollary Universal computers cannot compute every definable function.
Comment If the Turing’s thesis stands, see §4.3.1, then it follows that there are defin-
able functions that are not effectively calculable, see §3.1.5.
Comment There are* more mappings than processes.
§4.3.6 Definition The identity Turing machine, I, just halts.
Comment It does nearly nothing. But, wait!
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§4.3.7 Lemma ∀x ∈ E, I〈x〉 →֒ x, where I is the identity Turing machine.
Proof Whatever expression x ∈ E is written on the tape of I, that very same expression
x is written when I halts, because halting is all what I does. ⋄
Comment I does not touch the expression.
§4.3.8 Lemma The identity Turing machine is terminating, that is, I ∈ Σσ.
Proof The identity Turing machine, which just halts, is terminating, see §4.2.5, be-
cause it always halts; it only halts. ⋄
Comment I behaves, because sometimes ‘you can look, but you better not touch’.
§4.3.9 Lemma The identity Turing machine I : E → E is* the identity function i :
S→ S such that ∀x ∈ S, i(x) = x, that is, I ∗= i.
Proof The identity function i is an effectively calculable function, see §3.1.5. There-
fore, if the Turing’s thesis stands, see §4.3.1, then there is a Turing machine J such
that ∀x ∈ E, J 〈x〉 →֒ x. By Lemma §4.3.7, that Turing machine J is the identity
Turing machine I. ⋄
Comment If i = c(I), then U〈i p d〉 = I〈p d〉 →֒ p d, and U〈u p d〉 = U〈p d〉 = P〈d〉 →֒ r,
or ∞, see §4.2.3. Then i is the literal identity for expressions, or quotation, and u is
the functional identity for programs, or evaluation. Both are computable, but I ∈ Σσ
and U ∈ Σσ¯, see §4.2.7.
§4.3.10 Theorem Everything is* an expression, that is, E ∗= S.
Proof S is the set of everything, see §3.2.1. In computing, there are only computing
devices, T, and expressions, E, see §4.1.4. But then, by the program isomorphism,
see §4.1.12, computing devices are expressions, T ⊂ E. Therefore, in computing
everything is an expression. And now, if the Turing’s thesis stands, see §4.3.1, then
Lemma §4.3.9 also stands, so ∀x ∈ S, x = i(x) ∗= I〈x〉 →֒ x ∈ E. The converse,
∀x ∈ E, x ←֓ I〈x〉 = i(x) = x ∈ S, holds irrespective of Turing’s thesis. Therefore,
S
∗
= E. ⋄
Comment We will write x to indicate a computing point of view of x, but ∀x, x ∗= x.
For example, i
∗
= i.
§4.3.11 Lemma The set of solutions S is* countable, that is, |S| ∗= ℵ0.
Proof S
∗
= E, by §4.3.10, and |E| = |N| = ℵ0, by §4.1.5, therefore |S| ∗= |E| = ℵ0. ⋄
Comment We will refer to the set of solutions in a Turing universe as S∗. So we can
also write this lemma as |S∗| = ℵ0.
§4.3.12 Theorem Resolving is* computing, that is, T ∗= R.
Proof From Theorem §4.3.10, everything is* an expression, and taking transitions
and not states, it follows that whatever transforms expressions in computing theory,
that is, a Turing machine P, or its equivalent program p, or a λ-function of the λ-
calculus, is* equivalent to whatever transforms sets in set theory, that is, an effectively
calculable function, and it is* also equivalent to whatever transforms problems in
problem theory, that is, a resolution ℜ. Therefore, resolving is* computing, R ∗= T.
⋄
Comment ∗f
∗≡ P ≡ p ∗≡ ℜ, and ∗F ∗= T ∗= R.
Comment We can define functions that are not effectively calculable, see §4.3.5. Those
functions that cannot effectively calculate, cannot therefore transform, and they are,
in this sense, useless; we can define them, but we cannot use them.
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Corollary Metasolutions are* effectively calculable functions, that is, ΠS
∗
= ∗F.
Proof Because R = ΠS, see §3.5.8, so ΠS = R ∗= ∗F. ⋄
§4.3.13 Lemma The set of resolutions R is* countable, that is, |R| ∗= ℵ0.
Proof R
∗
= T, by §4.3.12, and |T| = |N| = ℵ0, by §4.1.13, therefore |R| ∗= |T| = ℵ0. ⋄
Comment We will refer to the set of resolutions in a Turing universe as R∗. So we can
also write this lemma as |R∗| = ℵ0.
§4.3.14 Lemma Predicate Pδs, where Pδs(x) = [x = s], is* effectively calculable.
Proof Both s and x are* expressions, by §4.3.10, so both are finite strings of symbols,
s = s1s2 . . . sn, and x = x1x2 . . . xm. Then we can define a Turing machine with n+2
states, that starts in state 1, and that when some string x is written on its tape, it
scans the string x, symbol by symbol, from the leftest one, this way: 1) in state i,
with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if the read symbol is si, then it writes a blank, goes to state i + 1,
and moves to the right, but if the read symbol is not si, then it writes a blank, goes
to state 0, and moves to the right; 2) in state n+ 1, if the read symbol is blank, then
it writes a ⊤, goes to state 0, and halts, but if the read symbol is not blank, then
it writes a blank, goes to state 0, and moves to the right; 3) in state 0, if the read
symbol is not blank, then it writes a blank, goes to state 0, and moves to the right,
but if the read symbol is blank, then it writes a ⊥, goes to state 0, and halts. This
Turing machine implements Pδs , and therefore Pδs is computable. ⋄
Corollary Problem δs = x? [x = s] is* expressible.
Proof Because problem δs condition Pδs is* effectively calculable, see §3.1.6. ⋄
Comment Problem δs is used in the proof of Theorem §3.2.1.
Corollary The only solution to problem δs is s, so Σδs = {s} ∈ S1.
Proof Because Σδs = { x | Pδs(x) } = { x | [x = s] } = {s}. ⋄
§4.3.15 Lemma The set of problems P is* countable, that is, |P| ∗= ℵ0.
Comment We will refer to the set of problems in a Turing universe as P∗. So we can
also write this lemma as |P∗| = ℵ0. If the condition of a problem is computable, then
the problem is in P∗; δs ∈ P∗, for example.
Proof Problem δs is* expressible, see §4.3.14. Then, δS∗ = { δs | s ∈ S∗ } ⊆ P∗ because
each δs ∈ P∗, and |δS∗| = |S∗| because there is a bijection δS∗ ⇔ S∗ : δs ↔ s. Also,
by Theorem §4.3.10, P∗ ⊆ E. Therefore, δS∗ ⊆ P∗ ⊆ E, and |δS∗| = |S∗| = ℵ0 = |E|,
and then, by the Cantor-Bernstein-Schro¨der theorem, |P∗| = ℵ0. ⋄
Comment The Cantor-Bernstein-Schro¨der theorem is Theorem B of §2, page 484, in
Cantor (1895). We have really used the equivalent Theorem C, in the same page.
§4.3.16 Theorem All problem sets are* countable, that is, |S∗| = |P∗| = |R∗| = ℵ0.
Proof By Lemmas §4.3.11, §4.3.15, and §4.3.13. ⋄
§4.4 Full Resolution Machine
§4.4.1 Definition A full resolution machine is a device that can execute any resolution.
§4.4.2 Theorem A full resolution machine is* a Turing complete device.
Proof By Theorem §4.3.12, resolving is* computing, ℜ ∗≡ P. This means that to
achieve the maximum resolving power is* to achieve the maximum computing power,
which is* the computing power of a universal computer, by Theorem §4.3.4. There-
fore, in a Turing universe a full resolution machine has to be Turing complete. ⋄
www.ramoncasares.com 20160902 PT 25
Comment To execute any resolution ℜ : P → 2S, the full resolution machine has to
calculate functions that can take functions and that can return functions without
limitations, as 22
S→2S → 22S→2S for meta-analogies, see §3.6.9. Then a full resolution
machine has to execute every possible function, and therefore, in a Turing universe,
it has to execute every computable function, and then it has to be a λ-calculus
interpreter, or an equivalent computing device, for example U .
Comment This means that problem resolving is* equal to computing, and then full
problem resolving is* equal to universal computing.
Corollary A full resolution machine* is a universal computer.
Proof Because a full resolution machine is* a universal computer. ⋄
Comment Now we will state two equivalences between computing theory and problem
theory concepts that are true in any Turing universe, and that are needed to show
the limitations of full resolution machines.
§4.4.3 Definition A set is recursively enumerable if there is a Turing machine that
generates all of its members, and then halts.
Comment If the set is infinite, the Turing machine will keep generating its members
forever.
Definition A set is computable if it is recursively enumerable.
§4.4.4 Theorem Resolvable in problem theory is* equivalent to recursively enumerable
in computing theory, that is,
Resolvable
∗
= Recursively Enumerable .
Proof To see that a problem is resolvable if, and only if, the set of its solutions is
recursively enumerable, just compare the definition of resolvable problem, in §3.5.4,
with the definition of recursively enumerable set, in §4.4.3. The only remaining gap is
to equate the valid resolution ℜ of the resolvable problem to the Turing machine of the
recursively enumerable set, a gap that we can bridge with the help of Theorem §4.3.12.
Finally see that, by the set isomorphism, see §3.2.9, we can refer interchangeably to
the problem π or to the set of its solutions Σpi. Then we can say that a problem is
recursively enumerable, or that a set is resolvable. ⋄
§4.4.5 Definition A set is recursive if its characteristic function can be computed by
a Turing machine that always halts.
§4.4.6 Theorem Expressible in problem theory is* equivalent to recursive in comput-
ing theory, that is,
Expressible
∗
= Recursive .
Proof The condition of a problem, Ppi, is the characteristic function of the set of its
solutions, because Σpi = { s | Ppi(s) }, see §3.2.2. Then, if the set of all the solutions
to a problem is a recursive set, see §4.4.5, then the condition Ppi can be computed by
a Turing machine that always halts. So the condition Ppi is an effectively calculable
function, and therefore the problem is expressible, see §3.1.6. If Turing’s thesis,
§4.3.1, is true, then the converse is also true; just go backwards from expressible to
recursive. Finally, by the set isomorphism, see §3.2.9, we can refer interchangeably
to the problem π or to the set of its solutions Σpi. Then, we can say that a problem
is recursive, or that a set is expressible. ⋄
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§4.4.7 Lemma The limitations of full resolution machines are* the limitations of uni-
versal computers.
Proof Because a full resolution machine is* a universal computer, see §4.4.2. ⋄
Comment Even if universal computers are the most capable computers, they cannot
compute everything, see §4.3.5. Now we will present three limits related to problems.
§4.4.8 Lemma A full resolution machine can* execute any resolution, but it cannot*
express some problems.
Proof There is a recursively enumerable set that is not recursive; this is the last
theorem in Post (1944) §1. Translating, by Theorems §4.4.4 and §4.4.6, to problem
theory: there is* a resolvable problem that is* not expressible. ⋄
Comment This is the problem limit of full resolution machines*.
Comment That last theorem in Post (1944) §1, page 291, is an abstract form of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem, see Post (1944) §2.
§4.4.9 Lemma A full resolution machine can* execute any resolution, but it cannot*
resolve some problems.
Proof Let us call κ some problem that is resolvable but not expressible, see §4.4.8.
This means that ∃ℜ | ℜ(κ) = Σκ, but 6 ∃Pκ | Pκ(x) = [x ∈ Σκ]. Note that |Σκ| ≥ ℵ0,
because otherwise ∃Pκ. Then its metaproblem Πκ is solvable but not resolvable. Πκ
is solvable because κ is resolvable, see §3.5.12, or, easier, because ℜ is a solution to
Πκ. For Πκ to be resolvable there should be a resolution that would find ‘all the
solutions of Πκ’, that is, ‘all the valid resolutions for κ’. But, whenever a possible
valid resolution for κ, let us call it ℜ′, generates a value not yet generated by ℜ, let us
call it z, we cannot decide whether z ∈ Σκ and it will be eventually generated by ℜ,
or if z /∈ Σκ and it will never be generated by ℜ; remember that κ is not expressible,
6 ∃Pκ. And, not being able to decide on z, we cannot decide whether ℜ′ is a valid
resolution for κ or not. ⋄
Comment This is the resolution limit of full resolution machines*.
Comment Problem κ is named after the complete set K of Post (1944), §3.
§4.4.10 Lemma A full resolution machine can execute any resolution, but it cannot
solve some problems.
Proof Simply because some problems have not any solution, Σpi = {} = ∅. ⋄
Comment This is the solution limit of full resolution machines, which also applies to
full resolution machines*.
Comment An unsolvable problem can be resolved by showing that it has not any
solution. For example, the decision problem of the halting problem, ∆η, see §4.5.4
below, was resolved unsolvable by Turing (1936), §8.
§4.4.11 Theorem A full resolution machine* can execute any resolution, but it can-
not express some problems (problem limit), and it cannot resolve some problems
(resolution limit), and it cannot solve some problems (solution limit).
Proof By Lemmas §4.4.8, §4.4.9, and §4.4.10. ⋄
Comment Full resolution machines* have limitations on each of the three main con-
cepts of the problem theory.
Problem
Resolution−−−−−−−−−−−−→{ Solution }
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§4.5 Problem Topology
§4.5.1 Definition The decision problem of a problem π = x?Ppi(x), written ∆π, is:
∆π = P? [P ∈ Σσ] ∧ [∀(x ∗= x), P〈x〉 ∗= Ppi(x)].
Comment A solution to the decision problem ∆π of some original problem π is a Turing
machine P that always halts and that computes the original problem condition Ppi
for any input. Decision problems are only defined in Turing universes, where x
∗
= x
by Theorem §4.3.10.
Comment This definition follows Post (1944), page 287.
§4.5.2 Definition The halting condition Pη : T× E→ B is:
Pη(P, d) =
{⊥ if P〈d〉 →֒ ∞
⊤ otherwise .
§4.5.3 Definition The halting problem is η = (p, d)?Pη(p, d).
Comment The halting problem η corresponds to the halting condition Pη by the con-
dition isomorphism of problems, see §3.1.7.
Comment Pσ(p) =
∧
d∈E Pη(p, d), see §4.2.5, so σ =
∧
d∈E η, by §3.1.7 and §3.1.10.
§4.5.4 Definition The decision problem of the halting problem, ∆η, is:
∆η = H? [H ∈ Σσ] ∧ [∀P ∈ T, ∀d ∈ E, H〈c(P) d〉 = Pη(P, d)].
§4.5.5 Theorem The decision problem of the halting problem ∆η has not any solution.
Proof Turing (1936), §8, resolved that ∆η is unsolvable. ⋄
Comment There is not any Turing machine that always halts and that compute Pη for
each possible input. There is not any algorithm a ∈ A that would compute Pη(p, d)
for every pair (p, d) ∈ P× E.
§4.5.6 Lemma The decision problem ∆π of some problem π is solvable if, and only if,
the problem π is expressible*, that is, ∆π is solvable⇔ π is expressible*.
Proof From solvable to expressible. That the decision problem ∆π is solvable, see
§4.5.1, means that there is a Turing machine that always halts, and that computes
Ppi for each possible input. Therefore, Ppi is effectively calculable, see §3.1.5, by a
Turing machine, and then the problem π is expressible, see §3.1.6, and then it is also
expressible*. Now from expressible to solvable. If a problem π es expressible, then
its condition Ppi is an effectively calculable function, see §3.1.6. Then, if the Turing’s
thesis stands, see §4.3.1, that is, if it is expressible*, then there is a Turing machine
P that can compute Ppi exactly as the effectively calculable function. P always halts,
because Ppi is a condition, so its result is finite. Therefore, the decision problem ∆π
of the problem has a solution, P, and then ∆π is solvable, see §3.2.14. ⋄
Corollary The halting problem η is not expressible*.
Proof The decision problem of the halting problem, ∆η, is not solvable, see §4.5.5,
and then the halting problem η is not expressible*. ⋄
Comment The halting problem η is inexpressible*, but solvable. While the decision
problem of the halting problem ∆η is unsolvable, the halting problem η has many
solutions.
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§4.5.7 Theorem The following equivalences stand:
∆π is solvable
∗⇔ π is expressible,
Ππ is solvable⇔ π is resolvable,
π is solvable⇔ π is solvable.
Proof The last one is trivial, and the other two equivalences were already proved by
Lemmas §4.5.6 and §3.5.12. ⋄
§4.5.8 Definition A problem π can be: expressible* (E) or not expressible* (E),
resolvable* (R) or not resolvable* (R), and solvable (S) or not solvable (S).
Comment An expressible problem is* equivalent to a recursive set, by Theorem §4.4.6,
a resolvable problem is* equivalent to a recursively enumerable set, by Theorem §4.4.4,
and an unsolvable problem is equivalent to an empty set.
Comment Then R is the set of computable sets, see §4.4.3.
Comment Not every combination is possible.
§4.5.9 Lemma If a problem is expressible*, then it is resolvable*, that is, E ⊂ R.
Proof Because every recursive set is recursively enumerable, E ⊆ R. This is a corollary
to the first theorem in Post (1944) §1. And E 6= R, see the proof of Lemma §4.4.8.
To translate between sets and problems we use Theorems §4.4.4 and §4.4.6. ⋄
Comment The first theorem in Post (1944) §1, page 290, states that a setM is recursive
if and only if both the set M and its complement M are recursively enumerable.
§4.5.10 Lemma If a problem is not solvable, then it is expressible*, that is, S ⊂ E .
Proof If a problem ν is not solvable, ν ∈ S, then Σν = {}, see §3.2.14. So ν is a
contradictory problem, see §3.1.11, and its condition Pν is the contradiction Pτ¯ , that
is, ∀x, Pν(x) = Pτ¯ (x) = ⊥. So Pν = Pτ¯ is an effectively calculable function, see
§3.1.5, and therefore ν is expressible, see §3.1.6, and then expressible*. And S 6= E ,
because (x? [2x = x2]) ∈ S ∩ E . ⋄
Comment Being expressible*, by Lemma §4.5.9, ν is also resolvable*: S ⊂ E ⊂ R.
§4.5.11 Theorem Regarding expressibility* E , resolvability* R, and solvability S, the
topology of the problem space is:
S ⊂ E ⊂ R ⊂ P .
Proof By Lemmas §4.5.9 and §4.5.10. As shown in the table, these lemmas prevent
four of the eight combinations, and the examples show that the other four do exist.
E R S Example & Comment
⊤ ⊤ ⊤ x? [2x = x2]
⊤ ⊤ ⊥ x? [2x = x2] ∧ [x > 2]
⊤ ⊥ ⊤ None, by Lemma §4.5.9
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ None, by Lemma §4.5.9
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ κ, see §4.4.9
⊥ ⊤ ⊥ None, by Lemma §4.5.10
⊥ ⊥ ⊤ Πκ, see §4.4.9
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ None, by Lemma §4.5.10 ⋄
Corollary Then, { S, E ∩ S,R ∩ E ,R} is a partition of P.
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Comment See below, in §6.2, that E ∗= P, and then P∗ ⊂ P. Also R ∗= 2S.
§4.5.12 Definition We say that a problem is finite, if the set of its solutions is finite.
We will refer to the set of finite problems as F . That is, F = { π | |Σpi| < ℵ0 }.
§4.5.13 Lemma The set of finite problems F is a proper subset of the set of expressible
problems E . The set of not solvable problems S is a proper subset of the set of finite
problems F . That is, S ⊂ F ⊂ E .
Proof F ⊂ E because all finite sets are recursive, but not the converse. S ⊂ F because
∀ν ∈ S, |Σν | = 0 < ℵ0, but (x? [2x = x2]) ∈ S ∩ F . ⋄
Proposition Including F , the topology of P is: S ⊂ F ⊂ E ⊂ R ⊂ P.
Corollary The topology S ⊂ F ⊂ E ⊂ R ⊂ P partitions the problem space P into
five non-empty places: S, F ∩ S, E ∩ F , R∩ E , and R.
§4.5.14 Remark The upper part of this topology is further refined by the so called
Turing degrees of unsolvability, that we will call Turing degrees of inexpressibility.
Turing degree zero, 0, corresponds to the first three places, because E = 0.
Comment Then, |E| = |0| = ℵ0, |R| = ℵ0, and |P| = 2ℵ0 > ℵ0. To complete the
cardinalities, |S| = 1, so |S| = 2ℵ0, and |F| = ℵ0.
§4.5.15 Remark Noting Ep the set of problems defined by a condition that can be
computed in polynomial time, and Rp the set of problems that can be resolved in
polynomial time, then Ep ⊂ E and Rp ⊂ R. The so called ‘P = NP?’ question
asks if Ep = Rp, because P = Ep and NP = Rp, and then it should be called the
‘Ep = Rp?’ question. See that the general question ‘E = R?’ was answered negatively
by Lemma §4.5.9, because E ⊂ R, and that Ep ⊆ Rp.
Comment A similar question is ‘Ep \ {∅} = Sp?’, where Sp is the set of problems that
can be solved in polynomial time, so Sp ⊂ S. The corresponding general question is
also answered negatively, because P = S ∪ {∅}, so E \ {∅} ⊂ S.
§5 Resolvers
§5.1 Semantics and Syntax
§5.1.1 Remark In this Section §5, we will always be inside a Turing universe, see
§4.3.3, and accordingly we will drop every asterisk. Though some results do not
depend on Turing’s thesis, by now the reader should know when it is the case.
§5.1.2 Definition A resolver is a device that takes problems and returns solutions.
Comment A resolver executes resolutions.
Comment After Theorem §4.3.12, we can equate a resolution ℜ ∈ R to the computing
device that executes the resolution P ∈ T, that is, ℜ = P.
§5.1.3 Definition We will call the domain of S semantics. We will call the domain of
S→ S syntax.
Comment As λ-calculus shows, we only need functions to implement any syntax.
Comment By Theorem §3.2.1, everything is in S, including S → S. But this is both
mathematically impossible, by Cantor’s theorem, and practically not interesting.
Example Using a practical example, if the problem is the survival problem, so some
behaviors keep the resolver alive, and the rest cause the death of the resolver, then S
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is the set of behaviors, and it does not include anything that is not a behavior, not
even predicates on behaviors, nor functions. Note that the condition of the survival
problem, which is satisfied if the resolver does not die, is a predicate on behaviors.
§5.1.4 Remark In this Section §5, we will assume that S is not the set of everything,
and, in particular, we will assume that there is not any function in S. We will focus on
the survival problem, and then assume that S is the set of behaviors, or finite state
automata, but you can think that S = N, or any other countable set, see §4.3.11.
Then we will build a series of resolvers, from the simplest one implementing one
element of S, to more complex resolvers that have to implement functions in order to
look for resolutions to deal with metaproblems.
§5.1.5 Definition A problem type, for example PΨ, is a subset of the set of problems,
that is, PΨ ⊆ P. We will note SΨ the set of the solutions to the type of problems PΨ.
That is, ∀πΨ ∈ PΨ, ΣpiΨ ⊆ SΨ ⊆ S.
Comment The survival problem is not a single problem, but a type of problems, PΩ;
each living being faces a different survival problem. But, in this case as in many
others, what it is certain is that the solutions to any of these problems is of a specific
kind. For example, while eating can be a solution, imagining how to eat is not a
solution, even though it can help us to get something to eat, because it can be a
metasolution. Then SΩ is the set of behaviors.
§5.1.6 Remark Metaproblems Ππ are a type of problem, ΠP = PΠ, and its solutions
are resolutions, ΠS = SΠ = R, see §3.5.8.
§5.1.7 Lemma If the set of the solutions to some type of problem is finite, 0 < |SΓ| < ℵ0,
then each and every problem of that type is expressible and resolvable.
Proof Because those problems are in F , so Lemma §4.5.13 apply. ⋄
Comment If 0 < |SΓ| = N < ℵ0, then |PΓ| = 2N < ℵ0 and |RΓ| = (2N )2N < ℵ0. In
the finite case, |SΓ| < |PΓ| < |RΓ| < ℵ0.
§5.1.8 Definition A constant function Ks : S→ S is: ∀s ∈ S, ∀x ∈ S, Ks(x) = s.
Comment Every constant function Ks is effectively calculable, see §3.1.5. They are
λ-definable; in λ-calculus, K = (λsx.s). This is because our λ-calculus includes the
K combinator, and so we refer to the λK-calculus simply as λ-calculus.
Special cases Tautology: K⊤ = Pτ . Contradiction: K⊥ = Pτ¯ . See §3.1.11.
§5.1.9 Definition The constant isomorphism is the natural isomorphism between S
and the set of constant functions K that relates each s ∈ S with Ks ∈ (S→ S). That
is, S⇔ K : s↔ Ks.
Comment We can extend any operation on S to K. For example, for any binary
operation ∗ on S, we define ∀x, [Ka ∗Kb](x) = Ka(x) ∗Kb(x) = a ∗ b = Ka∗b(x).
Comment Semantics is included in syntax, that is, S ∼= K ⊂ (S→ S).
§5.1.10 Remark A semantic function f : S → S is a syntactic element, f ∈ (S → S),
but it is not a syntactic function f ∈ ((S → S) → (S → S)), because the semantic
function f takes semantic elements and returns semantic elements, while, using the
constant isomorphism, the syntactic function f is not restricted. In particular, a
semantic function cannot take a function, and a semantic function cannot return a
function.
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Comment In semantics, literal identity i is the identity, see §4.3.9, because there are
not higher order functions in semantics. But, different syntactic objects can refer
to the same semantic object, as in f(x) = y, which means that f(x) and y are
two syntactic objects that refer to the same semantic object. Then, there are two
identities in syntax: literal identity i, or quotation, which is the semantic function
that just returns what it takes, and functional identity u, or evaluation, which is the
syntactic function that follows the references and returns the final one, see §4.2.3.
Note also that a syntactic object can refer to no semantic object, and then we say
that the syntactic object is a paradox.
§5.1.11 Definition The range of a resolver ℜ, noted Ξℜ, is the set of the problems
for which ℜ provides a non-empty subset of solutions, and only of solutions, that is,
Ξℜ = { π | ℜ(π)⊆Σpi ∧ ℜ(π) 6=∅ }.
Comment The range of a resolver is the set of the problems that the resolver solves.
§5.1.12 Definition The power of a resolver ℜ, noted Φℜ, is the set of the problems
that the resolver ℜ resolves, that is, Φℜ = { π | ℜ(π) = Σpi }.
Comment In practice, if |Σpi| > 1, it is not sensible to generate all the solutions, Σpi,
when just one solution solves the problem. In these cases the range of the resolver is
more important than its power.
§5.1.13 Theorem ∀ℜ, S ∩ Φℜ ⊆ Ξℜ.
Proof Because ∀π ∈ Φℜ ∩ S, we have that π ∈ Φℜ so ℜ(π) = Σpi, see §5.1.12, and
then ℜ(π) ⊆ Σpi, and also that π ∈ S, so |Σpi| > 0⇔ Σpi 6= ∅, see §4.5.8 and §3.2.14,
and then ℜ(π) = Σpi 6= ∅, and therefore π ∈ Ξℜ, see §5.1.11. ⋄
Comment For solvable problems, Φℜ ⊆ Ξℜ, so they are easier to solve than to resolve.
But unsolvable problems, some of them resolved, are impossible to solve!
§5.1.14 Definition We will say that the resources of a resolver are in a set if the
capability implemented in the resolver belongs to that set.
Comment Now we will construct a series of resolvers ℜn, from the minimal one that
only implements one solution, and then growing naturally step by step. Each resolver
will implement just one element out of its resources
Notation We will use {· ℜn ·} to refer to the set of all the resolvers of step n.
§5.2 Mechanism
§5.2.1 Definition A mechanism ℜ0 is any resolver that implements one member of
S. We will note ℜ0[s], where s ∈ S, the mechanism that implements s, that is,
ℜ0[s] = s ∈ S. Then the mechanisms resources are in S, and {· ℜ0 ·} = S.
Comment Mechanism ℜ0[s] returns s unconditionally.
Comment A mechanism ℜ0 implements a semantic unconditional computation.
§5.2.2 Notation As resolutions return sets of elements in S, to normalize the situation
of mechanisms ℜ0 we will use the singleton isomorphism, see §3.2.11, and we will write
ℜ0[{s}] to mean the singleton {s}, that is, ℜ0[{s}] = {ℜ0[s]} = {s} ∈ 2S.
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§5.2.3 Lemma ∀s ∈ S, Ξℜ0[{s}] = { π | Ppi(s) }.
Proof Just applying the definition of range, see §5.1.11, to the definition of mechanism,
we get: Ξℜ0[{s}] = { π | ℜ0[{s}]⊆Σpi ∧ ℜ0[{s}] 6= ∅ } = { π | {s}⊆Σpi ∧ {s} 6= ∅ } =
{ π | s∈Σpi ∧ ⊤} = { π | s ∈ Σpi } = { π | Ppi(s) }. ⋄
Comment The range of the mechanism ℜ0[s] is the set of problems for which s is a
solution.
§5.2.4 Lemma ∀s ∈ S, Φℜ0[{s}] = {δs}.
Proof Just applying the definition of power, see §5.1.12, to the definition of mechanism,
we get: Φℜ0[{s}] = { π | ℜ0[{s}] = Σpi } = { π | {s} = Σpi } = {δs}, the last equation
because Σδs = {s}, see §4.3.14. ⋄
Comment Mechanism ℜ0[s] only resolves problem δs.
§5.2.5 Lemma Any singleton routine resolution Rpi = {s} can be implemented by the
mechanism ℜ0[Rpi].
Proof If Rpi = {s}, then Rpi = {s} = {ℜ0[s]} = ℜ0[{s}] = ℜ0[Rpi]. ⋄
Comment In theory, we can equal any finite routine resolution to a union of a finite
number of mechanisms, Rpi = Σpi =
⋃
s∈Σpi{s} =
⋃
s∈Σpi{ℜ0[s]}.
§5.2.6 Summary In practice, it only makes sense to implement one solution, as ℜ0[s]
does. Without conditional calculations, the mechanism could not control when to
apply one result or any of the others, so it would gain nothing implementing more
than one.
Comment The mechanism is a body capable of one behavior.
Example A mechanism can only survive in a specific and very stable environment, as
it is the case of some extremophile archaea.
§5.3 Adapter
§5.3.1 Definition An adapter ℜ1 is any resolver that implements one condition on
the members of S. We will note ℜ1[PS ] the adapter that implements PS , where
PS ∈ (S → B), that is, ℜ1[PS ] = PS ∈ (S → B). Then the adapters resources are in
S→ B, and {· ℜ1 ·} = (S→ B).
Comment An adapter ℜ1 implements a semantic conditional computation.
§5.3.2 Lemma Each adapter ℜ1[PS ] implements one set of elements of S.
Proof Because every predicate PS defines a set S = { s ∈ S | PS(s) } ∈ 2S. The
condition PS is the characteristic function of S, ∀s ∈ S, PS(s) = [s ∈ S]. ⋄
Comment We will write ℜ1[PS ] = ℜ1[S] = S ∈ 2S. Only effectively calculable con-
ditions are implementable, and then adapters can only implement expressible, or
recursive, sets, E . Then, ℜ1[PS ] = ℜ1[S] = S ∈ E .
§5.3.3 Lemma Every mechanism ℜ0 is an adapter ℜ1, that is, {· ℜ0 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ1 ·}.
Proof For each mechanism ℜ0[s], which implements s ∈ S, there is an adapter ℜ1[Pδs],
see §4.3.14, that implements the singleton {s} ∈ (S → B). But not every set is a
singleton. Summarizing, {· ℜ0 ·} = S ⊂ (S→ B) = {· ℜ1 ·}. ⋄
Comment In Cantor’s paradise, but out of Turing universes, by the singleton (§3.2.11)
and the set (§3.2.8) isomorphisms: {· ℜ0 ·} = S ∼= S1 ⊂ 2S ∼= (S→ B) = {· ℜ1 ·}.
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§5.3.4 Lemma ℜ1[S] = ⋃s∈S{ℜ0[s]}.
Proof Because ℜ0[s] = s, so ⋃s∈S{ℜ0[s]} = ⋃s∈S{s} = S = ℜ1[S]. ⋄
Comment The results are the same, but not the implementation, because while the
adapter ℜ1[S] implements a condition, the union of mechanisms ⋃s∈S{ℜ0[s]} works
unconditionally. Thus, the output of the union of mechanisms is independent of
any problem, and then the union cannot implement ℜ1[PS ∧ Ppi] = ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi], for
example, so it cannot implement any trial, see Theorem §3.3.5.
§5.3.5 Lemma ∀S ∈ 2S, ∀π ∈ P, Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] = { π | S ∩ Σpi 6= ∅ }.
Proof Because Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] = { π | (ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] ⊆ Σpi) ∧ (ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] 6= ∅) } =
{ π | (S ∩ Σpi ⊆ Σpi) ∧ (S ∩ Σpi 6= ∅) } = { π | ⊤ ∧ (S ∩ Σpi 6= ∅) } =
{ π | S ∩ Σpi 6= ∅ }. ⋄
Comment The range of the adapter ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] is the set of problems that have any
solution in S. The adapter ℜ1[S∩Σpi] solves any problem such that any of its solutions
are in S.
Corollary If S ⊂ S′, then Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] ⊂ Ξℜ1[S′ ∩ Σpi].
Proof In that case, if a solution to a problem is in S, then it is also in S′. But there
are also solutions in S′ that are not in S. ⋄
§5.3.6 Lemma If s ∈ S, then ∀π ∈ P, Ξℜ0[{s}] ⊆ Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi].
Proof By Lemma §5.2.3, ∀π ∈ Ξℜ0[{s}], Ppi(s), that is, s ∈ Σpi, so, if s ∈ S, then
S ∩ Σpi 6= ∅, and therefore π ∈ Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi], by Lemma §5.3.5. ⋄
Definition We will call s ∈ S the adapter condition. If the adapter condition holds,
then the adapter ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] solves any problem that the mechanism ℜ0[s] solves.
Corollary If {s} ⊂ S, then Ξℜ0[{s}] ⊂ Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi].
Proof Because, if t ∈ S and t 6= s, then δt ∈ Ξℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] but δt 6∈ Ξℜ0[{s}]. ⋄
Proposition If {s} ⊂ S, then Ξℜ0[{s}] 6⊂ Ξℜ1[S].
Because δs ∈ Ξℜ0[{s}], but δs 6∈ Ξℜ1[S].
§5.3.7 Lemma ∀S ∈ 2S, ∀π ∈ P, Φℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] = 2S .
Proof Because Φℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] = { π | ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] = Σpi } = { π | S ∩ Σpi = Σpi } =
{ π | Σpi ⊆ S } = 2S , where the last equality uses the set isomorphism, see §3.2.8. ⋄
Comment The power of the adapter ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] is the powerset of S. The adapter
ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] resolves any problem such that all of its solutions are in S.
Corollary If S ⊂ S′, then Φℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] ⊂ Φℜ1[S′ ∩ Σpi].
Proof Just because, if S ⊂ S′, then 2S ⊂ 2S′ . ⋄
§5.3.8 Lemma If s ∈ S, then ∀π ∈ P, Φℜ0[{s}] ⊂ Φℜ1[S ∩ Σpi].
Proof Using the set isomorphism, see §3.2.8, δs = Σδs = {s}, and then, if s ∈ S,
Φℜ0[{s}] = {δs} = {{s}} ⊂ 2S = Φℜ1[S ∩ Σpi], by Lemmas §5.2.4 and §5.3.7. ⋄
Comment If the adapter condition holds, s ∈ S, then the adapter ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] resolves
any problem that the mechanism ℜ0[s] resolves, and more.
Proposition If {s} ⊂ S, then Φℜ0[{s}] 6⊂ Φℜ1[S], because δs 6∈ Φℜ1[S] = {S}.
§5.3.9 Lemma Any effectively calculable trial resolution Tpi(S) can be implemented by
the adapter ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi].
Proof Tpi(S) = { s ∈ S | s ∈ Σpi } = { s | s∈S ∧ s∈Σpi } = { s | PS(s) ∧ Ppi(s) }. Then
Tpi(S)
.
= ℜ1[PS ∧Ppi] = ℜ1[S ∩Σpi]. The equality is dotted because, if the trial is not
an effectively calculable function, then it cannot be implemented. ⋄
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§5.3.10 Summary In practice, an adapter ℜ1[PS∧Ppi] = ℜ1[S∩Σpi] has a body capable
of several behaviors that provides the set S of behaviors. If the current behavior were
not satisfying the adapter condition Ppi, which is interpreted as an error, then the
adapter would change its behavior trying another one in S.
Comment The adapter is a body capable of several behaviors, and a governor that
selects the current behavior.
Example A deciduous tree, which switches its behavior with seasons, is an adapter.
§5.4 Perceiver
§5.4.1 Definition A perceiver ℜ2 is any resolver that implements one transformation
of the elements in S into the elements in S. We will note ℜ2[f ] the perceiver that
implements f , where f ∈ (S→ S), that is, ℜ2[f ] = f ∈ (S→ S). Then the perceiver
resources are in S→ S, and {· ℜ2 ·} = (S→ S).
Comment From a semantic point of view, a perceiver ℜ2 implements a semantic func-
tional computation. From a syntactic point of view, a perceiver ℜ2 implements a
syntactic unconditional computation.
§5.4.2 Remark Perceivers are to syntax as mechanisms are to semantics.
Comment When solutions are functions S → S, then a perceiver does what a mech-
anism does, which is to return a solution unconditionally. That is, perceivers on
metaproblems are as mechanisms on problems. But, perceivers can go further.
Comment The perceiver ℜ2[f ] implements function f from S to S, that is, f : S→ S.
Then, ∀s ∈ S, ℜ2[f ](s) = f(s) ∈ S.
§5.4.3 Notation By the rewriting rules in §3.1.3, ℜ2[f ](S) = {ℜ2[f ](s) | s ∈ S } ∈ 2S.
Then ℜ2[f ](S) returns a set of solutions, as any well-behaved resolution should do.
Comment The perceiver ℜ2[f ](S) implements f , meaning that f is hardwired in the
perceiver, while S is just data. We will call what is implemented hardware, and
what is data software. We write the hardware between brackets, and the software be-
tween parentheses. We will assume that coding software costs less than implementing
hardware, or, in fewer words, that software is cheaper than hardware
§5.4.4 Lemma Every adapter ℜ1 is a perceiver ℜ2, that is, {· ℜ1 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ2 ·}.
Proof Because B ⊂ S, and then (S→ B) ⊂ (S→ S). So
{· ℜ1 ·} = (S→ B) ⊂ (S→ S) = {· ℜ2 ·}. ⋄
Comment Each adapter implements one condition PS ∈ (S → B). And any condition
PS ∈ (S → B) is also a function PS ∈ (S → S), because B ⊂ S. Therefore, for each
adapter ℜ1[PS ], which implements condition PS , there is a perceiver ℜ2[PS ] that
implements the function PS , and then we write ℜ1[PS ] = PS = ℜ2[PS ].
Comment Again, ℜ1[PS ] = ℜ2[PS ] explains that the results are the same, but not the
implementation.
§5.4.5 Lemma ∀S ∈ 2S, ℜ1[S] = ℜ2[i](S).
Proof Function i : S→ S is the semantic identity, i = i see §5.1.10, so ∀s ∈ S, i(s) = s,
and ℜ2[i](S) = {ℜ2[i](s) | s ∈ S } = { i(s) | s ∈ S } = { s | s ∈ S } = S = ℜ1[S]. ⋄
Comment The same perceiver hardware ℜ2[i], just by changing its software, can em-
ulate different adapters: ℜ2[i](S) = ℜ1[S], and ℜ2[i](S′) = ℜ1[S′]. Then the per-
ceiver ℜ2[i](S) is more flexible than the adapter ℜ1[S], because S is hardwired in the
adapter, while it is easily replaceable data for the perceiver.
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§5.4.6 Lemma ∀S ∈ 2S, Ξℜ1[S] = Ξℜ2[i](S) and Φℜ1[S] = Φℜ2[i](S).
Proof Because, by Lemma §5.4.5, ℜ1[S] = ℜ2[i](S). ⋄
Definition The perceiver condition is satisfied if it implements the semantic identity i.
Comment If the perceiver condition holds, then the perceiver ℜ2[i](S) solves any prob-
lem solved by the adapter ℜ1[S], and the perceiver ℜ2[i](S) resolves any problem
resolved by the adapter ℜ1[S].
Remark Semantic identity i is the ideal for perception.
§5.4.7 Corollary Ξℜ2[i](S ∩Σpi) = Ξℜ1[S ∩Σpi] and Φℜ2[i](S ∩Σpi) = Φℜ1[S ∩Σpi].
Proof By Lemma §5.4.6. ⋄
Comment The same perceiver hardware ℜ2[i] can be tuned to a different trial just by
changing its software, from ℜ2[i](S ∩ Σpi) to ℜ2[i](S′ ∩ Σρ), for example.
Proposition If S ⊂ S′, then Ξℜ2[i](S ∩Σpi) ⊂ Ξℜ2[i](S′ ∩Σpi), and Φℜ2[i](S ∩Σpi) ⊂
Φℜ2[i](S′ ∩ Σpi), by Lemma §5.4.5 and corollaries to Lemmas §5.3.5 and §5.3.7.
§5.4.8 Definition A function on sets F : 2S → 2S is elementable if it exists an
effectively calculable function f : S→ S such that ∀S, F (S) = { f(s) | s ∈ S }.
Comment We write F (S) = f(S), by the rules in §3.1.3. Note the three requirements:
that f is a semantic function, f : S → S, that f is effectively calculable, and that
F (S) = f(S).
Proposition Set identity I : 2S → 2S | ∀S ∈ 2S, I(S) = S, is elementable by semantic
identity i, because ∀S ∈ 2S, i(S) = { i(s) | s ∈ S } = { s | s ∈ S } = S = I(S).
§5.4.9 Lemma Any analogy resolution A ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TA can be implemented by the
tri-perceiver ℜ2[Ta](ℜ2[i](S ∩ ℜ2[a](Σpi))), if A is elementable by a, and TA by Ta.
Proof An analogy resolution is A ◦ TApi(S) ◦ TA. Both A and TA are functions from
sets to sets, TA : 2S → 2S and A : (P → P) = (2S → 2S), so if both A and TA
are elementable, then a perceiver can implement them. We have a and Ta, which
are both semantic functions such that A(S) = a(S), and TA(S) = Ta(S). Then
Papi = a(Ppi) = ℜ2[a](Ppi) = ℜ2[a](Σpi) implements the first third, Tapi(S) = ℜ1[PS ∧
Papi] = ℜ1[PS ∧ ℜ2[a](Ppi)] = ℜ1[S ∩ ℜ2[a](Σpi)] implements the second third, see
§5.3.9, and using §5.4.5, ℜ2[Ta](ℜ2[i](S ∩ ℜ2[a](Σpi))) implements the whole analogy
resolution a ◦ Tapi(S) ◦ Ta. ⋄
Corollary Identity analogy I ◦ TIpi(S) ◦ TI can be implemented by the bi-perceiver
ℜ2[i](S ∩ ℜ2[i](Σpi)), which uses the identity perceiver ℜ2[i] twice.
Proof ℜ2[Ti](ℜ2[i](S∩ℜ2[i](Σpi))) = ℜ2[i](ℜ2[i](S∩ℜ2[i](Σpi))) = ℜ2[i](S∩ℜ2[i](Σpi)),
because set identity I is elementable by semantic identity i, and TI = I, so it is also
elementable by Ti = i, and i ◦ i = i. ⋄
§5.4.10 Summary While an adapter uses a trial and error resolution, and this means
that error is part of the usual procedure, a perceiver executes the trial and error inside
itself. If the analogy provides a good model, then the internal trial is as good as the
external one, with the advantage that the errors are only simulated errors. More to
the point, if the problem the resolver faces is the survival problem, then the adapter
errors are literally death errors, or at least pain, while the perceiver errors are just
mental previsions of what not to do. See that, if the perceiver implements the identity
analogy, as ℜ2[i] does, then the model is good, because the internal problem is equal
to the external one. And the perceiver ℜ2[i] is more flexible than the adapter.
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Comment The perceiver is a body capable of several behaviors, a governor that selects
the current behavior, and a simulator that internalizes behaviors.
Example The perceiver governor determines what to do based upon an internal in-
terpretation. According to Lettvin et al. (1959), a frog is a perceiver that uses an
internal routine. Frog’s i is such that any dark point that moves rapidly in its field
of vision is a fly which it will try to eat.
§5.5 Learner
§5.5.1 Definition A learner ℜ3 is any resolver that implements one condition on the
members of S → S. We will note ℜ3[PF ] the learner that implements PF , where
PF ∈ ((S → S) → B), that is, ℜ1[PF ] = PF ∈ ((S → S) → B). Then the learners
resources are in (S→ S)→ B, and {· ℜ3 ·} = ((S→ S)→ B).
Comment A learner ℜ3 implements a syntactic conditional computation.
§5.5.2 Remark Learners are to syntax as adapters are to semantics.
Comment When solutions are functions S → S, then a learner does what an adapter
does, which is to return a predicate on solutions. That is, learners on metaproblems
are as adapters on problems. But, learners can go further.
§5.5.3 Lemma Each learner ℜ3[PF ] implements one set of members of (S→ S).
Proof Because every predicate PF : (S→ S)→ B defines a set
F = { f ∈ (S→ S) | PF (f) } ∈ 2S→S. The condition PF is the characteristic function
of F , ∀f ∈ (S→ S), PF (f) = [f ∈ F ]. ⋄
Comment We will write ℜ3[PF ] = ℜ3[F ] = F ∈ 2S→S.
Comment The learner ℜ3[F ] implements F ∈ 2S→S. So ∀s ∈ S, ℜ3[F ](s) = F (s) ∈ 2S,
because F (s) = { f(s) | f ∈ F }, by the rewriting rules in §3.1.3, and then ℜ3[F ](s)
returns a set of solutions, as any well-behaved resolution should do. Also, by the
same rules, ℜ3[F ](S) = F (S) = { f(s) | s∈S × f ∈F } ∈ 2S.
§5.5.4 Lemma Every perceiver ℜ2 is a learner ℜ3, that is, {· ℜ2 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ3 ·}.
Proof For each perceiver ℜ2[f ], which implements f ∈ (S → S), there is a learner
ℜ3[Pδf ], see §4.3.14, that implements the singleton {f} ∈ ((S → S) → B). But not
every set is a singleton. Then, {· ℜ2 ·} = (S→ S) ⊂ ((S→ S)→ B) = {· ℜ3 ·}. ⋄
§5.5.5 Lemma ℜ3[F ] = ⋃f∈F {ℜ2[f ]}.
Proof Because ℜ2[f ] = f , so ⋃f∈F {ℜ2[f ]} = ⋃f∈F {f} = F = ℜ3[F ]. ⋄
Comment Again, the results are the same, but not the implementation. The union of
perceivers
⋃
f∈F {ℜ2[f ]} cannot select a function to use, so it cannot implement any
meta-trial, as ℜ3[R ∩ ΣΠpi] does, see §5.5.11.
Comment These are not sets of solutions, but sets of semantic functions.
§5.5.6 Lemma ∀f ∈ F , ∀S ∈ 2S, ℜ2[f ](S) ⊆ ℜ3[F ](S).
Proof If f ∈ F , then f(S) = { f(s) | s ∈ S } ⊆ { f ′(s) | s∈S × f ′∈F } = F (S). ⋄
§5.5.7 Notation We will rewrite ℜ1[ℜ3[F ](S) ∩ Σpi] as ℜ3[F ](S ∩ Σpi).
Comment We can write ℜ1[ℜ3[F ](S) ∩Σpi] = ℜ3[F ](S ∩ Σpi), because any learner can
implement semantic conditions, that is, because {· ℜ1 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ3 ·}.
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§5.5.8 Lemma If f ∈ F , then ∀S ∈ 2S, ∀π ∈ P, Ξℜ2[f ](S) ⊆ Ξℜ3[F ](S ∩ Σpi).
Proof Firstly see that, if f ∈ F , then f(S) ⊆ F (S), by §3.1.3, so, f(S) ∩ Σpi ⊆
F (S) ∩ Σpi. Secondly see that ∀π ∈ Ξℜ2[f ](S), f(S) ∩ Σpi = f(S) 6= ∅. This is
because Ξℜ2[f ](S) = { π | f(S) ⊆ Σpi ∧ f(S) 6= ∅ }. Now, taking both together,
∀π ∈ Ξℜ2[f ](S), ∅ 6= f(S) = f(S)∩Σpi ⊆ F (S) ∩Σpi, so for these π, F (S) ∩Σpi 6= ∅.
Then these π ∈ { π | F (S) ∩ Σpi ⊆ Σpi ∧ F (S) ∩ Σpi 6= ∅ } = Ξℜ1[ℜ3[F ](S) ∩ Σpi],
because F (S) ∩ Σpi ⊆ Σpi is always true. ⋄
Definition We will call f ∈ F the learner condition. If the learner condition holds,
then the learner ℜ3[F ](S ∩Σpi) solves any problem that the perceiver ℜ2[f ](S) solves.
§5.5.9 Lemma If f ∈ F , then ∀S ∈ 2S, ∀π ∈ P, Φℜ2[f ](S) ⊆ Φℜ3[F ](S ∩ Σpi).
Proof If f ∈ F , then f(S) ⊆ F (S), see §3.1.3, so, f(S) ∩ Σpi ⊆ F (S) ∩ Σpi. Now
∀π ∈ Φℜ2[f ](S), f(S) = Σpi, and then for these π, Σpi = f(S)∩Σpi ⊆ F (S)∩Σpi ⊆ Σpi.
Therefore, for these π, F (S) ∩ Σpi = Σpi, and Φℜ2[f ](S) ⊆ { π | F (S) ∩ Σpi = Σpi } =
Φℜ1[ℜ3[F ](S) ∩ Σpi]. ⋄
Comment If the learner condition holds, f ∈ F , then the learner ℜ3[F ](S ∩Σpi) resolves
any problem that the perceiver ℜ2[f ](S) resolves.
§5.5.10 Corollary In particular, if i ∈ R, then Ξℜ2[i](S ∩ Σpi) ⊆ Ξℜ3[R](S ∩ Σpi)
and Φℜ2[i](S ∩ Σpi) ⊆ Φℜ3[R](S ∩ Σpi).
Proof By Lemmas §5.5.8 and §5.5.9. See that Ξℜ3[R](S∩Σpi ∩Σpi) ⊆ Ξℜ3[R](S ∩Σpi),
and Φℜ3[R](S ∩Σpi ∩ Σpi) ⊆ Φℜ3[R](S ∩ Σpi), because ℜ3[R](S ∩Σpi) ⊆ ℜ3[R](S), so
corollaries to Lemmas §5.3.5 and §5.3.7 apply (the equal case is trivial). ⋄
§5.5.11 Lemma Any meta-trial resolution TΠpi(R) can be implemented by the learner
ℜ3[R ∩ ΣΠpi], if PR and PΠpi are elementable.
Comment The diagram for the meta-trial, or trial of the metaproblem, see §3.6.9, is:
π
Π−−→Ππ TΠpi(R)−−−−−→ΣΠpi TΠ−−→Σpi .
Comment A learner solves metaproblems by trial, as an adapter solves problems by
trial. The following correlations stand: ℜ3 ↔ ℜ1, Ππ ↔ π, R ↔ S, and then
ℜ3[R ∩ΣΠpi]↔ ℜ1[S ∩Σpi]. Therefore, ℜ3[R ∩ΣΠpi] compares to ℜ2[i], where i ∈ R,
as ℜ1[S ∩ Σpi] compares to ℜ0[s], where s ∈ S.
Proof TΠpi(R) = { r ∈ R | r ∈ ΣΠpi } = { r | r∈R ∧ r∈ΣΠpi } = { r | PR(r)∧PΠpi(r) }.
In the meta-trial TΠpi(R), R is a set of resolutions, where R = (P→ 2S) = (2S → 2S),
that is, PR : (2
S → 2S)→ B, and the condition of the metaproblem Ππ is also PΠpi :
R → B = (P → 2S) → B = (2S → 2S) → B. So if both PR and PΠpi are elementable
by ℘R and ℘Πpi, then both of them, and its conjunction, are implementable. Then
TΠpi(R) = { r | PR(r) ∧ PΠpi(r) } .= ℜ3[℘R ∧ ℘Πpi] = ℜ3[R ∩ ΣΠpi]. ⋄
§5.5.12 Summary Perceiver success depends crucially on the analogy, that is, on how
much the analogy resembles the identity i. And a learner can adapt the analogy to
the problem it is facing, because the learner ℜ3[R] implements a set of functions R
from which it can select another analogy when the current one fails. Adapting the
analogy is also known as modeling. So a learner can apply different analogies, but a
learner can also apply a routine if it knows a solution, because the routine is more
efficient, or a trial, when the model is not good enough or too pessimistic.
www.ramoncasares.com 20160902 PT 38
Comment The learner is a body capable of several behaviors, a governor that selects
the current behavior, a simulator that internalizes behaviors, and a modeler that
adjusts the model used by the simulator.
Example Where there is modeling and simulation there is learning, because enhancing
the model prevents repeating errors. A dog is a learner.
§5.6 Subject
§5.6.1 Definition A subject ℜ4 is any resolver that implements one transformation
of the elements in S→ S into the elements in S→ S. We will note ℜ4[f] the subject
that implements f, where f ∈ ((S → S) → (S → S)), that is, ℜ4[f] = f ∈ ((S →
S) → (S → S)). Then the subject resources are in (S → S) → (S → S), and
{· ℜ4 ·} = ((S→ S)→ (S→ S)).
Comment A subject ℜ4 implements a syntactic functional computation.
§5.6.2 Remark Subjects are to syntax as perceivers are to semantics.
Comment When solutions are functions S → S, then a subject does what a perceiver
does, which is to return a function on solutions to solutions. That is, subjects on
metaproblems are as perceivers on problems. But, subjects can go further.
Comment The subject ℜ4[f] implements function f from S → S to S → S, that is,
f : (S→ S)→ (S→ S). Then, ∀f ∈ (S→ S), ℜ4[f](f) = f(f) ∈ (S→ S).
§5.6.3 Notation As resolutions return sets of elements in S, to normalize the situation
of subjects, for which ℜ4[f](f)(s) ∈ S, we will use the rewriting rules in §3.1.3 to get
ℜ4[f](F )(S) = {ℜ4[f](f)(s) | s∈S × f ∈F } ∈ 2S.
Comment Subject ℜ4[f](F )(S) has two software levels: semantics (S) and syntax (F ).
§5.6.4 Lemma Every learner ℜ3 is a subject ℜ4, that is, {· ℜ3 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ4 ·}.
Proof First we define set B = {K⊤, K⊥}, both functions S→ S, see §5.1.8. Next we
define the the natural isomorphism between B and B, mapping ⊤ to the function
that always returns ⊤, which is K⊤ = Pτ , and ⊥ to the function that always returns
⊥, which is K⊥ = Pτ¯ , see §3.1.11. And so B ⇔ B : ⊤ ↔ K⊤,⊥ ↔ K⊥, and
B ∼= B ⊂ (S → S). Then, ((S → S) → B) ⊂ ((S → S) → (S → S)), and therefore
{· ℜ3 ·} = ((S→ S)→ B) ⊂ ((S→ S)→ (S→ S)) = {· ℜ4 ·}. ⋄
Comment Each learner implements one condition PF ∈ ((S → S) → B). And any
condition on functions PF ∈ ((S → S) → B) is also a function on functions to
functions PF ∈ ((S → S) → (S → S)), because B ⊂ (S → S). Therefore, for
each learner ℜ3[PF ], which implements condition PF , there is a subject ℜ4[PF ] that
implements the function PF , and then we write ℜ3[PF ] = PF = ℜ4[PF ].
Comment Again, ℜ3[PF ] = ℜ4[PF ] explains that the results are the same, but not the
implementation.
§5.6.5 Lemma ∀F ∈ 2S→S, ∀S ∈ 2S, ℜ3[F ](S) = ℜ4[u](F )(S).
Comment Function u is the identity for programs, see §4.2.3, or functional identity, or
evaluation, see §4.3.9. Function u is syntactic because it is not restricted to semantic
objects, see §5.1.10. Syntactic function u is equivalent to λ-calculus I = (λx.x), see
§3.4.9: ∀f ∈ S→ S, u(f) = f and ∀s ∈ S, u(f)(s) = f(s).
Proof By the rewriting rules in §3.1.3, ℜ4[u](F )(S) = {ℜ4[u](f)(s) | s∈S× f ∈F } =
{ u(f)(s) | s∈S × f ∈F } = { f(s) | s∈S × f ∈F } = F (S) = ℜ3[F ](S). ⋄
Corollary ∀F ∈ 2S→S, ℜ3[F ] = ℜ4[u](F ).
www.ramoncasares.com 20160902 PT 39
§5.6.6 Lemma ∀F ∈ 2S→S, ∀S ∈ 2S, Ξℜ3[F ](S) = Ξℜ4[u](F )(S) and
Φℜ3[F ](S) = Φℜ4[u](F )(S).
Proof Because, by Lemma §5.6.5, ℜ3[F ](S) = ℜ4[u](F )(S). ⋄
Definition The subject condition is satisfied if it implements the functional identity u.
Comment If the subject condition holds, then the subject ℜ4[u](F )(S) solves any prob-
lem solved by the learner ℜ3[F ](S), and also the subject ℜ4[u](F )(S) resolves any
problem resolved by the learner ℜ3[F ](S).
Remark Functional identity u is the ideal for reason.
§5.6.7 Corollary In particular, Ξℜ4[u](R)(S ∩ Σpi) = Ξℜ3[R](S ∩ Σpi) and
Φℜ4[u](R)(S ∩ Σpi) = Φℜ3[R](S ∩ Σpi).
Proof By Lemma §5.6.6. ⋄
Comment Subject ℜ4[u](R)(S∩Σpi) is more flexible than learner ℜ3[R](S∩Σpi), because
R is software for the subject while it is hardware in the learner, and software is cheaper
than hardware, see §5.4.3.
§5.6.8 Theorem Subject ℜ4[u] is a full resolution machine.
Proof By Theorem §4.2.1 and Lemma §4.2.3, ℜ4[u] = u = c(U), so using the program
isomorphism, see §4.1.12, ℜ4[u] = U , which is a Turing complete device, and therefore
is a full resolution machine, by Theorem §4.4.2. ⋄
§5.6.9 Lemma Any effectively calculable resolution ℜ can be implemented by the sub-
ject ℜ4[u].
Proof By Theorem §5.6.8. ⋄
Corollary Any effectively calculable meta-analogy resolution A ◦ TAΠpi(R) ◦ TA can
be implemented by the subject ℜ4[u], including metaresolving, see §3.5.11.
§5.6.10 Summary The subject, by internalizing metaproblems, prevents meta-errors,
that is, the subject can test internally a resolution before executing it. The subject
is also more flexible than the learner, because subject modeling is done in software,
instead of in hardware. And subject ℜ4[u] can reason about any model. This means
that subject ℜ4[u] is a resolver that can calculate solutions, but also problems and
resolutions without limits; it can represent the problem it is facing to itself, and it
can represent itself to itself. In this sense, the subject ℜ4[u] is conscious.
Comment The subject is a body capable of several behaviors, a governor that selects
the current behavior, a simulator that internalizes behaviors, a modeler that adjusts
the model used by the simulator, and a reason that internalizes resolutions.
Example It seems that only our species, Homo sapiens, is Turing complete. We deal
with the evolution to Turing completeness and its relation to language in Casares
(2016b).
§5.7 Resolvers Hierarchy
§5.7.1 Theorem There is a hierarchy of resolvers:
{· ℜ0 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ1 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ2 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ3 ·} ⊂ {· ℜ4 ·}.
Proof Because S ⊂ (S → B) ⊂ (S → S) ⊂ ((S → S) → B) ⊂ ((S → S) → (S → S)),
by Lemmas §5.3.3, §5.4.4, §5.5.4, and §5.6.4. There are not more types of resolvers,
because there is not a resolver more capable than ℜ4[u] = U , by Theorems §5.6.8 and
§4.3.4. ⋄
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§5.7.2 Summary This table groups concepts closely related from problem theory, as
trial, computing theory, as adapter ℜ1, and set theory, as S ∈ S→ B.
Semantics Syntax
Routine Meta-routine
one Mechanism ℜ0 Perceiver ℜ2 element
s ∈ S f ∈ (S→ S)
Trial Meta-trial
some Adapter ℜ1 Learner ℜ3 set
S ∈ S→ B F ∈ (S→ S)→ B
Analogy Meta-analogy
any Perceiver ℜ2 Subject ℜ4 function
f ∈ S→ S f ∈ (S→ S)→ (S→ S)
S S→ S
Elements Functions
Comment A perceiver is a syntactic mechanism. A learner is a syntactic adapter. A
subject is a syntactic perceiver. A subject is a syntactic2 mechanism.
§5.7.3 Theorem The problem theory is complete.
Proof Aside from definitions, the problem theory posits that there are three ways to
resolve a problem: routine, trial, and analogy; see §2.3. Adding the metaproblem of
the problem, we get five ways to resolve a problem and its metaproblem, which are the
basic three plus meta-trial and meta-analogy, see §3.6.8. For each way there is a re-
solver, see Lemmas §5.2.5, §5.3.9, §5.4.9, §5.5.11, and §5.6.9, and the resources of each
resolver are in a series of mathematical objects of increasing generality that covers
everything until syntactic functions, see §5.7.1 and §5.7.2. Now, to execute meta-
analogies, 22
S→2S → 22S→2S, see §3.6.9, or at least the elementable ones, see §5.4.8,
we need subjects, which implement syntactic functions (S → S) → (S → S). And
there is a subject that is a Turing complete device, ℜ4[u], see §5.6.8, so it has the
maximum computing power, see §4.3.4, and then the maximum resolving power, see
§4.4.2. This means that there are not more resolvers beyond the subject, and there-
fore that the series is complete, and then that the problem theory covers everything
and is complete. ⋄
Comment It also means that no more resolutions are needed, although we could do
without routine, for example, by using Theorem §3.3.7, and then reducing routines
to trials. Nevertheless, a routine is not a trial, because a semantic element is not
a semantic set, or because a mechanism implementing a routine is not an adapter
implementing a trial, see comment to Lemma §5.3.4.
Comment This theorem is true if the Turing’s thesis is true, see §4.3.1. Conversely,
if this theorem is true, then ‘what is effectively calculable to resolve problems is
computable’.
§5.7.4 Remark Provided that a bigger range means more survival opportunities, that
software is cheaper than hardware, that the adapter, the perceiver, the learner, and
the subject conditions are satisfied in some environments, and that in each step the
increasing of complexity was overcome by its fitness, then an evolution of resolvers
—mechanism to adapter to perceiver to learner to subject— should follow.
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Comment Although depending on conditions, see Lemmas §5.3.6, §5.4.6, §5.5.8, and
§5.6.6, the evolution of resolvers is directed, and its final singularity is the Turing
complete subject ℜ4[u].
Comment In detail, the strictest evolution of resolvers is: Ξℜ0[s]
{s}⊂S⊂ Ξℜ1[S ∩Σpi] S⊂S
′
⊂
Ξℜ2[i](S′∩ Σpi)
{i}⊂R⊆ Ξℜ3[R](S′ ∩ Σpi)
R⊂R′⊆ Ξℜ4[u](R′)(S′ ∩ Σpi).
§5.7.5 Thesis We are the result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem.
Argument The resolvers hierarchy suggests an evolution of resolvers of the survival
problem, see §5.7.4. And lacking of better explanations, that we are Turing complete
resolvers, that is, subjects ℜ4[u] = U , see §4.2.8, suggests that we are indeed the
result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem.
Comment Our species is Turing complete. Therefore we must explain the evolution of
Turing completeness.
§6 Conclusion
§6.1 Purpose
¶1 · The problem theory is the union of set theory and computing theory. The integration
of the two theories is achieved by using a new vocabulary to refer to old concepts, but
mainly by giving the old theories a purpose that they did not have: to resolve problems.
For example, a set defined by intension is named a problem, and the same set defined by
extension is named its set of solutions. While both still refer to the same set, as it is the
case in set theory, the status of each of them is now very different: one is a question and
the other is an answer. And when the problem theory states that computing is resolving,
it is calling a set resolvable if it is recursively enumerable, but mainly it is saying that
the transition from intension to extension has to be calculated, because it is not written
magically in “The Book”; someone has to write it.
¶2 · The purpose of resolving problems is not final, but the main conclusion of the paper,
the Thesis §5.7.5, is nearly ultimate: We are Turing complete subjects because we are
the result of an evolution of resolvers of the survival problem. In other words, we resolve
problems to survive. So, if survival is indeed the ultimate purpose, then the problem
theory provides purpose and meaning to set theory and to computing theory.
¶3 · The final Thesis §5.7.5 also closes a loop, because a Turing complete resolver ℜ4[u]
can model everything, and then everything can be a solution, as it is stated in Theorem
§3.2.1. But those everythings are not absolute, but limited to what is computable, see
§4.4.11. That is, if Turing’s thesis stands, see §4.3.1, then everything is everything that
is computable. This way a restriction of computing theory, countability, is inherited by
problem theory and transferred to set theory; see the details below in Subsection §6.2.
The other question that requires some more elaboration is the status of the Turing’s
thesis itself, which we will postpone until Subsection §6.3.
¶4 · Nevertheless, besides that main Thesis §5.7.5, the problem theory concepts presented
in this paper can be used to model, understand, and classify both natural and artificial
resolvers, because the paper provides definitions, theorems, and taxonomies for resolvers,
and also for problems. And, by the way, the paper defines adaptation, perception, and
learning, and it shows that there are just three ways to resolve any problem: routine,
trial, and analogy.
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§6.2 Countability
¶1 · In computing everything is countable, see §4.1.14, and the problem theory in Turing
universes inherited countability from computing theory, see §4.3.16. In a Turing universe,
see §4.3.3, the limits of calculation are the limits of computing, and then there are only
computable functions, including predicates, see §4.1.9, and computable sets, see §4.4.3.
Then the problem theory in Turing universes is consistent if and only if computing is
consistent. And computing is consistent, as a corollary to Church-Rosser theorem in
λ-calculus, see Curry & Feys (1958) Chapter 4.
¶2 · Therefore, our way to control paradoxes in set theory, and then in this paper, is to
confine ourselves to Turing universes. But don’t worry; if this is a Turing universe, as it
seems to be, then we are only excluding imaginary universes.
¶3 · For example, the mathematical theorem that states that everything is a solution is
proved, and it makes sense, see §3.2.1. But it also causes paradoxes, because from it we
derive P ⊂ S, but P 1= (S → B) 2= 2S, and then |P| 3= |2S| 4= 2|S| > |S|, by Cantor’s
theorem. It is not a paradox in a Turing universe because the forth equality is false in
it. The second equality is false in a Turing universe because, as we saw in Lemma §4.4.8,
there are resolvable problems that are not expressible, so (S → B) ∗⊂ 2S. The third
equality is true, though it follows the second one! And the forth equality is false in a
Turing universe because the number of computable sets is countable, so, if |S∗| = ℵ0,
then |2S|∗ = ℵ0 < 2ℵ0 = 2|S∗|, that is, |2S| ∗< 2|S|. Therefore, P∗⊂ S∗ is true, but P∗ is the
set of computable predicates, that is, P∗ = E of §4.5.8, and [2S]∗ ⊂ S∗ is also true, but
[2S]∗ is the set of computable sets, that is, [2S]∗ = R of §4.5.8. The conclusion is that S∗,
the set of solutions, is the set of everything that is computable.
¶4 ·We have just rejected the uncountable case, where |P| > ℵ0, but there are two other
possibilities: the (infinite) countable case, where |S∗| = |P∗| = |R∗| = ℵ0, see §4.3.16;
and the finite case, where |SΓ| < |PΓ| < |RΓ| < ℵ0, see §5.1.7.
¶5 ·We are finite, so it would be natural to restrict our investigations to the finite case,
calling for finiteness instead of calling for countableness. But the finite case is trivial,
and more importantly, the difference between an unrestricted universal computer and
a finite universal computer is not qualitative but quantitative. There is not any step
of any calculation that an unrestricted universal computer can compute and a finite
universal computer cannot compute, see §4.2.10. So in the limit, that is, without time
nor memory restrictions, we are universal computers. And note that those restrictions
are variable, and that they can be relaxed nearly as desired just spending some more
time, or building a faster computer machine, or using some more external memory. In
the case of a Turing machine, the external memory is the tape, and the internal memory
is where its processor keeps the internal state, see §4.1.3. Note also that we can code a
program to generate every natural number, although we cannot follow the computation
till its end. Summarizing: we are better defined saying that we are qualitatively universal
Turing machines, but with some unspecified quantitative limitations, than saying that we
are qualitatively finite state automata, because finite state automata are not expandable.
¶6 · Finally, the rejections of finiteness and uncountableness imply that countableness is
the golden mean. This is Pythagorean heaven revisited, everything is countable, but this
time we have rescued the terrifying
√
2, and other irrational numbers. As Kronecker said:
“God made counting numbers; all else is the work of man”.
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§6.3 Intuition
¶1 · Is it possible to resolve a non-computable problem? A problem is computable if,
by definition, see §4.4.3 and §4.4.4, a Turing machine can execute a valid resolution of
the problem, so the non-computable problem would not be resolved by computing, but
by other means. My answer to the question is ‘no’, because I think that a problem is
resolvable if, and only if, the problem is computable, see §4.3.12.
¶2 · Nevertheless you may think otherwise, and say that there is another way of resolving,
let us call it ‘intuition’, that is not computable. If that were the case, then the problem
theory with its mathematical formulation, as presented in this paper, would capture the
concept of ‘computable problem’, but not the whole concept of ‘problem’. In order to see
this, please consider the following two statements:
◦ Some problems are computable.
◦ A universal computer can execute any computable resolution.
Even if you believe that there are resolvable problems that are not computable, you can
still decide easily that both are true; the first is a fact, and the second is a theorem. And
then everything in this paper would still be true of computable problems, computable
resolutions, and computable solutions.
¶3 · The key point in this discussion is that ‘intuition’ would refute Turing’s thesis, see
§4.3.1, because if there were ‘intuitive’ resolutions, then we could effectively calculate
what is not computable. Turing’s thesis is not a theorem, and we follow Post (1936)
in considering Turing’s thesis to be a law of nature that states a limitation of our own
species calculating capacity, see Casares (2016a), by which we are bound to see ourselves
as a final singularity. Summarizing: If Turing’s thesis were eventually false, then this
problem theory would be about computable problems. But, while Turing’s thesis remains
valid, the problem theory is about problems, the set of effectively calculable functions is
countable (§4.3.1), universal computers are the most capable computing devices (§4.3.4),
everything is an expression (§4.3.10), resolving is computing (§4.3.12), and the problem
theory is complete (§5.7.3).
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